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Administrative Law Stories
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe
Peter L. Strauss*
Ma ny ye ars later, tired at last
I hea ded for ho me to look for m y past
I looked for the meadows, there wasn’t a trace
six lanes of highway had taken their place
where were the lilacs an d all that they mean t
1
noth ing b ut acres of tar and cem ent. .. .

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe is easily one of the most important cases in the
administrative law repertoire, with 4,640 citing opinions listed by Sheppards as of the end of 2004.
The great bulk of those citations draw on its elaboration of the scope of review appropriate for
agency exercises of judgment. In the instance, as you know, what was at issue was the Secretary of
Transportation’s judgment that federal funds could be expended to build Interstate 40 through
Overton Park, in Memphis, Tennessee, in the face of a pair of federal statutes that seemed severely
to burden that judgment in order to protect parkland values. What may not be so readily apparent
to you is that the case helps mark a turning point in American administrative law, brought about by
a relatively small number of recent law school graduates. Its legal innovations occurred at the hands
of lawyers just a few years out of law school, who successfully entered largely uncharted territory
pro bono publico. It seems at least possible that you would be inspired by such a story.
The burgeoning Interstate Highway system had spawned heartache and controversy across the
*
Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University. The original version of this essay, which appeared as Peter L.
Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls O ver Administrative Actions A ffecting the Community,
39 U CLA L. Rev. 12 51 (1992), began with this:

Mo re people provided helpful support than one could normally list here -- Memphians such as James Jalenak
and Charles Newman, opposing counsel in the Overton Park litigation; Dean Fred Davis and his colleagues at
the Cecil B. Humphreys School of Law of Memphis State University; participants in faculty colloquia at
Columbia and the University of Minnesota Law Scho ols; the participa nts in this Sym posium; and individual
colleagues and friends like Bernie Black, Cynthia Farina, and Daniel Gifford. Iqbal Ishar, Columbia, LL.M.
'87, W illiam B ruce, M emp his State University '94, and the staff of the Memphis and Shelby Co unty and the
Memp his State U niversity Libraries provided valuab le resea rch sup port, and the Frank A. Sprole Fund and
Columbia Law School Alumni provided welcome financial assistance.
Respo nsibility for any errors is, of course, mine. In this essay, in particular, I write with limited access to my
research materials. Able to spend only a week in M emp his, I relied on the extensive clippings file and paper
collections at the Memphis and Shelby County Library and the Memphis State University Library. Mr. Bruce
subsequently went to the microfilm record s of the M emp his Co mmercial A ppe al and the M emp his
Press-Scimitar to check what was in my notes and provid e full citation forms. He w as unable to find a few of
these citations, as will be evident from the form of citation in some of the footnotes. This may be the result of
my error in transcribing or a librarian's error in preparing a clipping for the file. While I am confident of the
physical reality of the articles cited, I deeply regret that time has not permitted confirming the precise date and
place of their publication.
I have not been able to return to the Memphis materials in revising this essay, but now have also to thank new colleagues
Gillian Metzger and John Fabian W itt for their thoughtful readings and suggestions, CPOP attorney John Vardaman for
hours of enlightening conversation and permission to cast my eye over his litigation files, and the faculty of the James
Rogers School of Law at A rizona University.
1

Verdelle S mith’s “T ar and Cem ent” (1 966 ) climbed as high as 3 8 in B illboard’s ratings, acco rding to
http://www .top4 0db .net/; for one week it was the most popular song in Australia.
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country, as the lyrics of a 1966 pop song attest. But until the litigation of Overton Park and a few
other cases that accompanied it, citizens voiced their protests not in the courts but through politics.
The beginning of public interest litigation on issues like highway construction or other
environmental matters dates from its time. Lexis reveals that during the decade of the 60's, the two
long-established national environmental organizations who were among the several named plaintiffs
in Overton Park, the Sierra Club and the National Audubon Society, were plaintiffs in only one
reported decision;2 that decision was reported in 1969, the year in which the Overton Park complaint
was filed and, as it happens, also concerned an element of the interstate highway system. For the
1970's, a search for these two names returns 149 hits; for the 1980's, 337; for the 1990's, 499; and
for the period January 1, 2000 to mid-2004, 297.3 Something happened.
Overton Park represents a transition from political to judicial controls over decisions broadly
affecting a wide range of community interests. Unmistakable and dramatic as it is, that transition
is not universally applauded. One can easily find in decisions and legal literature today continuing
hesitation over how deeply the courts should be engaged in controlling matters susceptible of
political resolution – whether the gains in legality are not overmatched by losses to gridlock and
inertia, whether the resulting system is not too open to the tactics of obstreperousness and delay. But
the transition was striking and quick. The late sixties and early seventies saw an explosion of new
national legislation on social and environmental issues, that often provided explicitly or implicitly
for citizen remedies. Four scientists founded the Environmental Defense Fund in 1967, as part of
their effort to halt the use of the pesticide DDT that devastated raptor populations by weakening their
egg shells. In 1968, recent law school graduates founded Washington’s Center for Law and Social
Policy, a pioneering effort. Law Reports devoted to environmental law began to emerge in 1969,4
the year the National Environmental Policy Act was enacted. Newly minted lawyers established the
Natural Resources Defense Council in 1970. In that year, too, as clinical legal education began,
young lawyer-teachers at a Columbia Law School program on law and welfare brought to the
Supreme Court – and won – Goldberg v. Kelly5 and Barlow v. Collins6 (one of a pair of cases
significantly extending standing doctrine that year). The Sierra Club established its Legal Defense
Fund, and Ralph Nader his Public Citizen, in 1971. In many respects, Overton Park marked the turn.
Stories are uniquely the product of a narrator’s vision. For a case, like this one, that has appeared
to different participants in remarkably different ways, what seems appropriate is to attempt to see
how the course of events leading to decision in Overton Park might have appeared through a number
of eyes. After a brief mis en scene to set the framework, that is what these pages will do. Of course,
you the reader have only one narrator; but he has attempted to people these pages and evoke their
varying perspectives as faithfully as his research and capacity for empathetic understanding permit.
Much of what follows draws on his earlier essay, Revisiting Overton Park, which appeared in the
pages of the UCLA Law Review in 1992 and on the sensitive story-setting “reply” contributed by

2

Citizens’ Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Vo lpe, 302 F .Supp. 10 83 (SD NY 196 9); id., 297 F.Supp. 804 and

809.
3

Lexis search of combined federal and state cases for “Name(S ierra Club) or Name(N ational Audubon Society)”
with appropriate date ranges, conducted July 28, 2004.
4

The Citizen’s Committee case, n. 2 above, appears in Volume 1 of bo th the Environmental Law Rep orts (1 ELR
20001 ) and BN A’s Environment Reporter (1 ER C (BN A) 1096 ).
5

397 U.S. 254.

6

397 U.S. 159.
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Prof. Lucie White.7 The release of the papers of Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall for public
view, and the availability of transcripts of oral argument in the United States Supreme Court library
and litigation files in the possession of CPOP Attorney John Vardaman, have permitted
supplementing the 1992 account.
Overton Park and Interstate 40
In the 1950's, Memphis, Tennessee was a southern city of 450,000 or so, about sixty percent
white and forty percent black. Long the center of the cotton trade, it was the largest commercial
center on the Mississippi between New Orleans to the south and St. Louis to the north. Its civic
leaders supposed it to be in competition with each. If one imagines a boll of cotton oriented east
from a Mississippi River stem, the commercial center of town was where the boll joins the stem; the
black population lived in the dark casing of the boll, north and south and bending eastward; and the
white population lived in the cotton itself.8 There was no circumferential road system ) indeed, no
highway system at all ) and a single bridge across the Mississippi, a bit to the south of the city
center, brought long distance travellers through.
Overton Park is the Central Park of Memphis, a 342-acre city park long considered the city’s
principal greenspace asset. It is roughly rectangular in shape, approximately a mile long by half a
mile wide, with its longer sides pointing east and west. Surrounded by campuses and gracious
homes, it lies in the center of the cotton, embedded in its predominantly white residential area. Its
eastern boundary is a major north-south connector. At a time when the city was reasonably compact,
the two wide boulevards marking the park’s northern and southern boundaries were the principal
streets carrying traffic between eastern suburbs and downtown. A zoo lies in the western half of the
park’s northernmost part; the zoo’s fenced southern boundary is a long-established, two lane road
whose use was restricted to municipal buses. South of the bus road and zoo are a nine-hole golf
course, a theater, an art museum, and landscaped open areas. To the east, Lick Creek, a rivulet
occasionally swollen by storm run-off, runs north to south. The eastern half of the park contains
picnic areas and 170 acres (about a quarter of a square mile) of virgin forest; riding and walking
trails integrate the ensemble.
The planners who created the interstate highway system in the 1950’s mapped out Interstate 40
as a transcontinental route that would cross the Mississippi at Memphis on a new bridge, somewhat
north of the existing one. It would connect Memphis with Nashville to the northeast and Little Rock,
Arkansas to the southwest. As usual, the plans combined inter-city expressway with enhanced local
commuter access, locating the bridge and route to provide a high-speed east-west corridor through
the city’s heart. A circumferential beltway was also planned, but the tight character of its
interchanges (together with the economies of driving fewer miles) made clear the expectation that
through traffic would stay on I-40 itself. From the outset, the plans called for the intra-city corridor
to bisect Overton Park. Although the park might have been avoided without giving up that corridor,
its central location, the established commutation routes, and the expected impacts of the alternatives
all made this the “obvious” choice. Initially, I-40's footprint on the park was going to be quite large.

7

Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over Administrative Actions Affecting
the Community, 39 UCL A L. Rev. 1251 (1992); Lucie E. W hite, Revaluing Politics: a Reply to Professor Strauss, 39
UCLA L. Rev. 133 1(1992 ). The read er is entitled to kno w that I was an attorney in the O ffice of the S olicitor General,
but not the attorney responsible for Overton Park, during this period. Tha t professional relationship has, I hope
understandably, limited my ability and willingness to write about the history of the case in that office.
8

See D. Tucker, Memphis since Crump: Bossism, Blacks and Civic Reformers, 1948-1968 104 (1980)
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Eventually, however – part of the following story – its imposition shrank to only 26 acres.9
The issues of location and design were treated separately both statutorily and administratively,
and it will be useful to keep them separate. Although many locations were studied, two emerged as
the park’s chief competitors. One, following the northern edge of the park, would have cut off the
park from the north, and disrupted university, school, church and other facilities that existed there.10
The second followed creekbeds and a railroad right of way somewhat to the north; among its other
disadvantages, it would severely have impacted one of the few racially mixed residential areas in the
city . Location within the park was a more fluid issue: an early accommodation to the resistance was
to superimpose the route through the park on the existing bus road rather than have it cut a new path;
and moving a planned interchange outside the park boundaries significantly reduced the park acreage
required.
Four principal design alternatives were debated throughout the long history of the controversy:
building the road on the surface; building it below grade to the extent the water table and natural
drainage constraints permitted; building it below surface throughout its length, overcoming water
table and drainage problems; and constructing a tunnel in some fashion, hiding the road completely
throughout its traverse of the park. Prior to the Court's decision, Tennessee highway officials
consistently sought the first alternative ) the cheapest, least complicated, and most familiar form of
construction ) relying on landscaping to reduce the impact of the road and its traffic on the park.
City officials were more open to building below grade, but consistently expressed concerns about
both costs and the possible results of ignoring water table and drainage constraints: they feared that
building the road below water table and creek levels would risk flooding if power outages in storms
stopped the electric pumps that would then be required; and in any event they believed it would
create bodies of still water in which malarial mosquitoes could breed at each end of the inverted
syphon that would be used to conduct the creek under the roadway. Thus, for the city, the high local
water table meant that I-40 should never be more than ten feet or so lower than the surrounding park,
and that it should rise above grade to cross Lick Creek. Federal officials consistently pursued the
more dramatic and far more expensive possibilities of building the road in a trench below the water
table, of syphoning Lick Creek's flow under the entrenched roadway, or indeed of tunneling the
whole length of the park. When in 1969 the Bureau of Public Roads approved the second design )
below grade to the maximum extent drainage and the water table permitted ) the parties to the
litigation may well have thought that the principal statutory issue the courts would be called upon
to decide would be whether this choice reflected "all possible planning to minimize harm to [the]
park"; this was the design issue under the two federal statutes enacted late in the planning process.
In the wake of the Court’s decision, the Secretary never identified another feasible route; design
remained the principal administrative issue for as long as Tennessee pursued its hopes of completing
I-40 by constructing its inner-city Memphis leg, with federal officials offering a tunnel, and state and
local officials proposing a ditch..
A Chronology

9

As described by the 6th Circuit,

[A]p proximately 4,80 0 feet in length[, t]he existing highway is 40 to 50 feet wide. The proposed interstate will
consist of six lanes -- three running in each d irection, separated by a median strip approximately 40 feet wide.
The interstate right-of-way will vary from ap proximately 250 feet in width to approximately 450 feet in width,
and will require the use of approximately 26 acres of the Park. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 432
F.2d 130 7, 1309-10 (1 970).
10

Id. at 1311.
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1944

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 initiates federal role in planning a national system of
highways.

1950

Congress requires state highway officials to provide an opportunity for public meetings if
they plan for a federally supported highway to “bypass” a center of population.

1953

Memphis undertakes its first study of limited access freeway possibilities.

1955

Memphis’s new “civic reform” government receives and preliminarily approves the study,
proposing a circumferential ring highway, a new Mississippi River Bridge, a north-south
expressway east of the commercial center, and an east-west expressway through the park.

1956

The Interstate highway system and Highway Trust Fund are launched; Congress amends the
existing requirement that states hold a local hearing if a federally funded road will “bypass”
a population center, by adding “or going through” such a center. I-40's siting in Overton
Park is federally approved for the first time.

1957

Surveys for I-40 begin, giving prominence to the plan to use Overton Park; Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park [CPOP] is founded; in November, the City Commission holds wellattended public hearings, resulting in an extensive restudy of alternative routes.

1958

Federal-Aid Highway Act extends the state hearing requirements to encompass rural routing
of limited access highways, which might bisect farms or cut them off from town.

1961

Tennessee holds the federally required hearing for the Overton Park segment in Memphis,
with the State Highway Commissioner presiding and much opposition voiced. Recordings
are incomplete. The city’s Engineer later promises to build it last, and only if needed. The
first five miles of the southern circumferential highway are built.

1962

Federal-Aid Highway Acts further amended; state officials must now cooperate with the
officials of cities larger than 50,000 in a “continuing, comprehensive transportation planning
process” to resolve routing issues.

1964

The circumferential highways are substantially completed, and political pressure concerning
the east-west highway mounts, reaching the governor (in an election year) and the head of
the Federal Bureau of Public Roads [BPR]. BPR officials negotiate a reduced park footprint.

1965

The City Commission votes to approve the route 4-1, assuring the State Highway Commissioner of its support. He adopts further measures ameliorating its impact and, under
gubernatorial pressure, again studies alternative routes. The north-south legs of the
expressway are built. In December, the federal BPR head visits Memphis to consult.

1966

In January, “reaffirm[ing] our previous approval,” the BPR head wrote the Tennessee
Highway Commissioner that “the most exacting efforts to assure a finished product which
is in keeping with the area and future park usage [are a] condition to our action.” Congress
later enacted the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966; effective July 1, 1968, states must assure
“all possible planning, including consideration of alternatives ... to minimize any harm to ...
[any] park” that might be affected by interstate highway construction. Within weeks, it also
enacted the Department of Transportation Act creating the Department of Transportation
[DOT] and giving new attention to environmental and “beautification” issues. Section §4(f)
of this statute, effective April 1967, directed the Secretary not to approve the use of
important parklands for highways “unless (1) there is no feasible or prudent alternative to the
-5-

use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to
such park.” In November, Tennessee voters elected a new Governor, and Memphis voters
approved a new form of city government.
1967

Tennessee’s new Governor and Highway Commissioner characterized the route through the
park as “the most direct and the most economically feasible.” On March 15, before §4(f)
became effective, the BPR gave preliminary approval to the design for I-40 in the park. On
May 2, the City Commission again voted 4-1 to accept the route. Also that month, BPR
authorized acquisition of approaches, and the state began preparing the ground for the eastwest road. In November, the new city government was elected; the road was not a significant
election issue. The Senate Public Roads Committee held hearings into urban highways,
treating Overton Park as a trouble spot. In December, DOT promised a visit by top officials
to help Memphis make a decision it “should make ... because you are best equipped to make
it – because you will know what will make your commerce thrive and what will make the
lives of your people more meaningful.”

1968

January: A number of political meetings in Memphis, including several with CPOP.
February: FHA Administrator Bridwell visits Memphis to talk with the new City Council
and CPOP. After a public hearing, he says I-40 will be built through Overton Park unless
the City Council changes its view. The racially charged garbagemen’s strike begins.
March: On March 5, the Council unanimously adopted a resolution stating its preference
that I-40 be routed elsewhere – if need be, along the park’s northern boundary. Much
political lobbying ensued, with Administrator Bridwell seeking a specific, reasonably well
developed routing proposal. Equivocating, the Council asked to meet with Bridwell again.
The garbagemen’s strike escalated, leading to riots and the visit of Martin Luther King. On
March 31, reflecting turmoil over Vietnam, Lyndon Baines Johnson announced that he would
not be seeking reelection to the presidency.
April: On April 3, Administrator Bridwell met with City Council at the Memphis Airport.
CPOP was excluded and recording instruments proved to have been inoperative. On April
4, the City Council voted 8-2 to approve both “the route presently designated” and its design.
Moments later, Martin Luther King was assassinated at the Lorraine Motel, and the country
erupted in flames. On April 19, Administrator Bridwell reaffirmed the earlier route
approvals and called for further attention to design. Tennessee’s governor and the
congressman from Memphis announced their support of this decision.
May: Transportation Secretary Boyd and Administrator Bridwell testified at length in
congressional hearings about their administration of §4(f) in general and the Overton Park
controversy in particular. The Committee appeared to receive his testimony sympathetically,
and to reflect that in its subsequent report supporting what became the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1968. That Act, effective August 23, 1968, changed the statutory formula of the
FAHA to match §4(f) of Department of Transportation Act.
June: Robert Kennedy was assassinated. Administrator Bridwell required the Tennessee
Highway Department to considering deepening the trench in which I-40 would be placed or
a tunnel, previously excluded for expense and engineering reasons.
November: A new federal President, Richard Nixon, is elected. His Secretary of
Transportation will be John Volpe, former principal of a major construction company.
-6-

1969

After further discussions with federal officials about deepening the trench, the Tennessee
Highway Department held a design hearing in Memphis May 19. Recording equipment
again failed. Pressure for a tunnel continued, with a reported intervention by the Secretary
of the Interior. In September, Tennessee paid Memphis over $2 million for 26 acres of
Overton Park; by ordinance, the city committed those funds to purchasing 405 acres of
additional park lands. On November 5 Secretary Volpe granted design approval after the
state and city had accepted further deepening of the trench (but no tunnel). In December,
CPOP filed suit to block construction of I-40 through Overton Park.

1970

CPOP lost in both the District Court and the 6th Circuit. Construction preceded on the
approaches to the park, clearing all property up to its borders. CPOP filed in the US
Supreme Court an emergency motion for stay pending the filing of a petition for certiorari;
opposed by the government, it was argued December 7. Certiorari was immediately granted,
with CPOP’s brief on the merits due December 21 and the government’s January 4, 1971;
argument was set for January 11. The government then filed a motion to remand (to permit
departmental officials to file statements of reasons), which was denied December 18.

1971

At oral argument, the Solicitor General presented statements by the Secretary and the
Administrator purporting to explain their reasoning. The opinions remanding the case were
handed down seven weeks later, on March 2. The district court then held a 27-day hearing.

1972

On Jan. 5, 1972, the district court remanded the case to the Secretary with instructions to
reconsider the case under a correct understanding of the statute. The Secretary held hearings
in Memphis in the fall.

1973

Without specifying what it was, Secretary Volpe found that there was at least one “feasible
and prudent alternative” to the route through Overton Park.

1974

The 6th Circuit upheld the Secretary’s judgment, declining to require him to say what the
“feasible and prudent alternative” is. President Nixon resigned and was replaced by
President Ford. Tennessee submitted a new proposal to use an open cut in the park.

1975

William Coleman became Secretary of Transportation and announced a provisional decision
favoring tunneling under the Park.

1976

In August, Tennessee held hearings on tunnel design in Memphis; when Jimmy Carter was
elected President, federal officials cancelled a mid-November hearing at the state’s request.

1977

Tennessee twice submitted designs for partial tunneling; the Department rejected both.

1978

The U.S. Senate held hearings on the tunnel/trench controversy

1981

Three days before the inauguration of Ronald Reagan, Tennessee asked that the segment of
I-40 through Memphis be dropped from the Interstate system and that $300 million in federal
funds committed to the project be released to the city for other transportation purposes.

1987

Tennessee deeded the 26 acres of Overton Park back to Memphis.
BUILDING THE INTERSTATES NATIONALLY
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The United States Congress
As the preceding timeline reveals, highway planning legislation developed step by step over the
quarter century preceding Overton Park. It began with straightforward economic concerns and
gradually incorporated a wider range of issues and an expanding federal bureaucracy. Congress
reached the environmental and amenity issues of parkland use ambiguously and late, and before the
courts had been invoked. As is hardly surprising in the absence of highway planning litigation, the
congressional documents and debates address neither the place of the courts nor the utility of judicial
processes. In this story the issues are largely political ones. To the extent politics was distrusted –
as, for example, productive of corruption at the hands of those who stood to profit from routing
decisions11 – the proper response was to put planning into the hands of professional technocrats –
first, the highway engineers, and then the city planners.
Until the second half of the 20th century, roads were the business of local communities if they
were in-town; states if they connected towns; and the federal government hardly at all. Federal aid
to the states for highway construction began in 1916,12 but a federal role in planning did not emerge
until definition of the National Interstate and Defense Highway system in mid-century. By the time
Congress began to focus on road-building as a setting for possible federal standards and/or
procedures, states and localities had settled into a general pattern: outside incorporated areas, states
generally controlled which roads would be built and where. If Highway 13 passed through Elmtown,
the state would bring the road to the town limits on either side, leaving the town to plot and pay for
its transit. It was the state that made the judgment whether to go through Elmtown at all, or rather
to bypass it in favor of a straighter, cheaper, or faster route elsewhere.
These allocations of responsibility, and the tensions and political temptations they produced,
were reflected in the arrangements made for decision. Highway planning at the state level became
the domain of the professionalized highway engineer. Limited funds were available for building the
connective road tissue of the state, and every community had a stake in how those judgments were
made; judgments had to be made about construction, safety and carrying capacity as well as route.
It was obvious in the circumstances that responsibility should be placed in the hands of a
technocratic office removed from the distortions of politics and informed by the science of roadbuilding, that could translate traffic patterns, geography and engineering parameters into an efficient
network.13
Within the cities, roads were in the domain of the urban planner. People more easily saw that
roads were only one element of infrastructure and of future growth, in relation to others. And the
professional interests of city planners are correspondingly more embracive than those of highway

11

See T ippy, Review of Route Selection s for the Federal-Aid H ighwa y System s, 27 MON T. L. REV. 131, 137

(1966)
12

Federal-Aid Road Ac t, ch. 291, 39 Stat. 355 (1916).

13

As the P resident of the A merican Association of S tate Highway Officials to ld Co ngress in 196 8,

State highway adm inistrators by and large dislike the philosophy that local lay people [should] have a more
prominen t role in highway location and design. ... To allow local people to have a greater voice ... for which
they are not trained wo uld negate the experience o f trained highway pro fessionals.
Quoted in Ben Kelley, The Pavers and the Paved 128-29 (1971). Kelley directed the press office in the Department of
Transportation from its founding in the Johnson adm inistration. While his book has some of the flavor of the several
"highway exposes" published in the late 1960's and early 1970's (e.g., A. Q. Mo wbray, Road to Ruin (1968 ); H. Leavitt,
Superhighways - Superhoax (1970)), his position gives his account particular interest. The account of general change
in these p aragraphs draw s significantly on it.
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engineers; whether to use roads or subways to transport urban workers, or what balance to strike
between transportation and the need for urban green spaces, were questions much more likely to
appeal to, and to be relevant to the professional judgments of, the one than of the other. State and
urban political tensions were mirrored in the resulting professional juxtapositions.14
Thus we see in 1950, as the first effect of the post-war explosion of suburban growth and roadhaul commerce, Congress requiring states to hold public meetings to air the possible economic
effects of bypassing a center of population before it could route a federally supported highway
around town. The state must certify that the state official making a bypass judgment has considered
the question of economic impact. Evident in the limited legislative history of the provision is both
an awareness of the professionalization of state judgments on such questions, and skepticism about
their soundness.15 Providing a forum for the small businessmen of a community to express their
views on the proposal (there can have been little doubt what those views would be) would arm
political processes that might avoid the worst excesses of cold technocratic judgment.
Congress soon heard from other voices wanting a seat at the state planning table. In 1956 it
amended the statute to require a hearing on the question of economic effects (and a certification by
the state department that these issues had been considered) for every routing decision made in the
vicinity of a concentration of population – whether it would “bypass” a city, town or village, or go
through it. And 1958, with limited-access interstate highways now in prospect, it acted again – to
extend the hearing process to persons in rural areas through or contiguous to whose property a
highway would pass; the engineers were making their decisions without much regard for the impact
on Farmer Jones’ acres or his ability to get to town.16
The political character of the remedies thus created is clear when one sees that Congress attached
no substantive requirement to its hearing demands. It did not ask the hearer to opine or to judge, or
to articulate a reasoned conclusion; it does not seem to have imagined that judicial review could
ensue. Within the structure of the highway grant program, as it was understood, the federal
government had little if any enforcement role. Congress put such federal responsibility as there was
in the Bureau of Public Roads, a unit of the Department of Commerce. The BPR served largely as
a conduit for grant program funds, did not actively supervise state highway commissions. Refusing
funds because a state made the wrong choice, or imperfectly implemented procedures, does not seem
to have been part of its repertoire.17 Without flatly banning any routing choice, these provisions

14

See M. Levin & N. Abend, Bureaucrats in Collision: Case Studies in Area Transportation P lanning 236-42

(1971).
15

Little towns and villages are being ruined because . . . an engineer has an idea that automobiles going
to the ne xt town should be ab le to reach it five minutes sooner.

96 Co ng. Rec. 13,006 (195 0) (statement of Sen. Chavez, chairman of the Senate Public Works Co mmittee).
16

The resulting statute may now be found in 23 U.S.C. §128, an elem ent of the 195 8 codification of the F ederal-Aid
Highwa y Acts.
17

As the Federal Highway Administrator informed his senatorial oversight committee:

Under Bureau procedures, the States first propose the general location of a designated route o r section thereof,
which, if found satisfactory, is tentatively agreed upon by the Bureau. Following this, the States proceed with
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Hearings before a Subcomm ittee of the Senate Committee on Public W orks on Bills Relating to the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1958, 85th Co ng. 2d Sess. 98-99 (1958 ).
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provided a focus for arousing opposition. Such congressional discussion of the provisions as there
was ) and there was very little ) focused on the immediate political benefits of having an
opportunity to be heard. It expressed the hope, perhaps even sentimentally, of having some impact
within state processes; there was no plan for enhancing federal bureaucratic, much less federal
judicial, controls.18 The evident expectation was that having to discuss plans in public before they
were made final would both tend to assure attention to the issues and arm the informal processes by
which various interests might be expected to make their wishes known. The legal literature of the
time, two decades before “The Reformation of American Administrative Law,”19 is virtually empty
of discussion20 and the caselaw, undeveloped.
To cast the provisions in this light is not to suggest that they were thought inconsequential.
Members of Congress are practical politicians, and need not have acted with either judicial or
bureaucratic controls foremost in their thoughts. They would have understood that road-building
decisions were matters of tremendous consequence to states and localities, and that the states would
have decision mechanisms roughly responsive to political realities. Leaving the judgment to politics,
in this sense, was a natural instinct; forcing the issue onto the table, thus giving access to local
politics, was a significant federal intrusion ) yet one that respected the local character of the ultimate
decision.
By 1962, Congress was directly responding to tensions between highway engineers and urban
planners over roadbuilding issues. Now the Federal-Aid Highway Acts conditioned approval of
federal-aid highway projects in an urban area of more than 50,000 population on the use of a
"continuing, comprehensive transportation planning process carried on cooperatively by states and
local communities." The states must talk to the cities; and they must talk to them in the professional
terms that most concerned the cities ) city planning, not simply highway engineering. This change
was not connected with the hearing processes, as such; indeed, explanations of it tended to stress
(however unrealistically) that city planning, like highway engineering, was a technocratic process
removed from "the vagaries of the political system."21 The apparent impulse was to provide for
inputs that, within state processes, would inform and perhaps divert the highway juggernaut from
concerns only about speed, directness, safety and cost.
Parklands entered the picture in the mid-1960's. The publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent
Spring in 1962 catalyzed environmentalism as a public movement. People began to see the
Interstate Highway System as a threat to beloved parks and historic areas – not just Overton Park,
but the French Quarter in New Orleans and, notably, Breckinridge Park in San Antonio, Texas.
Although the BPR was already requiring administratively that state processes include consultation
with public agencies having jurisdiction over parks and other outdoor amenities that might be
affected by highway construction, the political uproar – and perhaps the convenience of a

18

The decision to honor local interests in this way, it may be noted, had overtones contrary to the usual federal
interest in interstate commerce. It was bypassing a town that would facilitate the interstate carriage of goo ds; there would
be no traffic light at the intersection of Main and Oak, no slowing for a school crossing or reduced speed limit. To insist
that towns a bou t to be b y-passed have notice and an opportunity to speak ) roughly translated, to gather whatever
political force they could in op pos ition to the plan ) was to acknowledge the local character of the decision in an
unusually forceful way.
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Richa rd Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1760-90 (1975).
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See Schw artz, Urban Freeways and the Interstate System, 49 S. CAL . L. REV. 406 , 480-82 & n.45 5 (1976 ).
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Hea rings Before the Subc omm. on Road s of the Senate Com mittee on Pub lic Works, 90th Cong., 2d. Sess., 509
(1968) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of FHW A Adm inistrator Bridwell).
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beautification diversion from the horrors of the war in Vietnam22 – persuaded Congress that this was
an issue it had to address.
Texas Senator Ralph Yarborough’s concern over Breckinridge Park spurred enactment in 1966
of the park-protective provisions in both the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966 and the Department
of Transportation Act. The two provisions differed in their requirements for consideration of park
values. The Federal-Aid Highway Act, passed in September and effective July 1, 1968, required
federal highway administrators to engage in "all possible planning, including consideration of
alternatives . . . to minimize any harm to . . . [any] park" that might be affected by interstate highway
construction.23 Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, passed one month later but
effective upon the Department's formation in April, 1967, directed the Secretary not to
approve any program or project which requires the use of any publicly owned land from a
public park . . . of national, State, or local significance as determined by the Federal, State,
or local officials having jurisdiction thereof . . . unless (1) there is no feasible or prudent
alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to
minimize harm to such park . . . resulting from such use.24
The meaning of §4(f) proved central to decision in Overton Park.
While one could go on at length about the specific legislative histories of these two provisions
and their differences,25 perhaps the most important point ) and one that helps explain the apparent
casualness of the difference between two provisions on the same subject enacted within weeks of
one another ) is that they were small elements of larger packages, elements respecting which close
congressional attention was not to be expected. In framing the larger context, the change of
importance was the creation of a national Department of Transportation, which assumed the prior
responsibility of the Department of Commerce for highway construction, but now as an element of
national transportation planning generally. Embedding the Bureau of Public Roads (now the Federal
Highway Administration) in a new structure with responsibilities for mass transportation and other
like issues changed the dynamics from promotion to balance, made it more likely as a political and
bureaucratic matter that highway decisions would be taken with more in view than the professional
concerns of highway engineers. To take only one example ) itself a product of increasing
environmental awareness ) the engineers would now have to deal with an office within the
22

LadyBird Johnson’s role in promoting highway beau tification was perhaps her most visible activity as F irst Lady.
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Federal Highway Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-574, 80 Stat. 766, 771.
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Department of Transportation Act of 1966, § 4(f), Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931, 934.
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Both provisions o riginated in the Senate. The Fed eral-Aid Highway Act originated in the Senate Public W orks
Committee, the Department of Transportation Act, concerned overall with governm ent org anization, in the S enate
Committee on Governmental Operations. In each case, the Senate language concerning park values was more restrictive
than ultimately enacted, reflecting the Sen ate’s (and, particularly, Senator Y arboro ugh’s) consistently greater enthusiasm
for elevating park p rotection than the H ouse felt. In the Hou se, these measures were explained in the House as reflecting
concern for human values ("if there were a choice between using public parkland or displacing hundreds o f families ...
I would want the Sec retary to weigh his decisio n carefully and not feel he was forced by the p rovisio n of the b ill to
disrupt the lives of hundreds of human beings," Rep. Rowstenkowski, 112 Cong. Rec. 25 ,591-92 (daily ed. 10/13/66)),
although it was associated in some other minds with greater House attachment to pork barrel politics and the highway
lobb y. See, e.g., Mo wbray, n.13 above, p. 220 ff. In considering the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966, the conference
committee substituted the language enacted for a Senate-passed provision that would have prohibited approval unless
there were " no feasible alternative to the use of [park] land ", 11 2 Cong.R ec. 14 074 (1966); in considering the
Department of Transportation Act, it inserted the additional qualifier "and prudent." 112 Cong.Rec. 19530 (1966); see
also Gray, Environmental Requirements of Highway and Historic Preservation Legislation, 20 Cath.U.L.Rev. 45 (1970 ).
Neither provision was much disc ussed at the time; the difference in effective date was ascribed, in the Ho use, to sim ple
oversight on the part of the co nference co mmittee. 112 Cong.R ec. 25 592 (Rep . Holifield, Daily ed. 10/13 /66).
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Department specifically responsible for promoting environmental awareness and responsiveness.26
For the first time, Congress had unambiguously made federal highway officials the source of
approval, not merely guidance, respecting highway location issues. Yet the legislation and its
supporting materials suggest an expectation that these requirements would be enforced politically,
not judicially. Section §4(f), like other aspects of the Department of Transportation Act, required
consultation with other parts of the federal government ) the Departments of Agriculture, Housing
and Urban Development, and the Interior ) that could be counted upon to bring other values to bear
in controversial situations. The legislative materials suggest no recognition, much less expectation,
that judicial enforcement might be in the offing. Congress’s surprising experience with judicial
enforcement of the National Environmental Protection Act still lay in the future. "Public interest
representation" rationales had, as yet, no prominent voice. It is difficult to ascribe to the approval
requirement any expectation that highway decisions would be controlled by other than bureaucratic
and associated political means.
Two years later, Congress was asked to reconcile the competing statutory formulations; in the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 196827 it chose the formulation of §4(f). Litigation was in the air by
now, but had not yet emerged as a significant source of control over highway administrators. In May
of 1968, both Secretary Boyd and Federal Highway Administrator Bridwell testified as months of
hearings on urban planning, location and design before the Subcommittee on Roads of the Senate's
Committee on Public Work drew to a close. Their testimony continued to envision highway
decisionmaking in essentially political terms. It strongly supported wide consultation and the
involvement of local politics to determine community interests and engage planning across a wide
range of issues, rather than simply rely on the professional expertise of highway engineers. "We
have no choice," the Secretary argued, "but to follow planning procedures which are sensitive to the
needs of individual communities and elicit community involvement in the development of the
plans."28
What transpired about Overton Park in particular is best left to later discussion,29 but one can say
summarily that the committee heard the administrators sympathetically, and then turned immediately
to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. This bill would resolve the linguistic inconsistency
between section 138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966 and §4(f) by choosing the §4(f)
26

Gray, n. 25 above.
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Pub. L. No. 90-49 5, 82 Stat. 815 (1968 ).
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Hea rings, supra note 21, at 455 (testimony of Alan S. Boyd, Secretary of Transportation). In contrast, consider
the May 6 testimony of Governor John Volpe of Massachusetts, the former contractor who would shortly become
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at 248-49 (testimony of John A. Volpe, Governor of M assachusetts and Chairman of the Governor's Conference).
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and Ope rations; Freewa y Signin g, and Related Geo metrics: Hearings Before a Special Subcomm. on the F ederal Aid
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formulation,.30 The bill’s focus, however, was not on this detail but on the general problem of urban
disruption occasioned by expressway construction. In that context, the legislation moved
unmistakably toward balance, and larger participation of local political processes as against the state
highway technocracies. Thus, much of the Committee effort, led by Senator Baker of Tennessee,
was to develop a more effective and equitable program for relocation of displaced individuals, an
effort which matured as Title II of the 1968 Highway Act. Section 128 of Title 23, which previously
required State highway departments to provide public hearings only to consider the economic effects
of urban highway projects, was amended to require that these hearings also consider the "social
effects of such a location, its impact on the environment, and its consistency with the goals and
objectives of such urban planning as has been promulgated by the community."31 Having heard both
departmental plans for enlarging political participation in highway planning, and highway officials'
objections that the Department's political approach to §4(f) would slow and deprofessionalize the
process,32 the Committee knew that adding these factors would require greater involvement by local
government officials and agencies and by private individuals and groups.33 It followed the
Secretary’s suggestion and endorsed the §4(f) formulation. There was no discussion of the
possibility or effects of judicial enforcement.
The Senate Committee's actions overall seem strongly to endorse the general approach to that
section the Department had described in its testimony. The Committee remarked in its report,
The Committee is firmly committed to the protection of vital park lands, parks, historic sites,
and the like. We would emphasize that every thing possible should be done to insure their
being kept free of damage or destruction by reason of highway construction. The Committee
would, however, put equal emphasis on the statutory language which provides that in the
event no feasible and prudent alternative exists, that efforts be made to minimize damage.
...
The committee would further emphasize that while the areas sought to be protected by
section 4(f) . . . and section 138 . . . are important, there are other high priority items which
must also be weighed in the balance. The committee is extremely concerned that the
highway program be carried out in such a manner as to reduce in all instances the harsh
impact on people which results from the dislocation and displacement by reason of highway
construction. Therefore, the use of the park lands properly protected and with damage
minimized by the most sophisticated construction techniques is to be preferred to the
movement of large numbers of people.34
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See text following note 23 above.
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Section 128 of Title 23 was amended again in December 197 0, effective immediately, to add the requirement that
the certification by the State Highway Department regarding public hearings and the consideration of eco nom ic, social,
and environmental effects "shall be accompanied by a report which indicates the consideration given to the economic,
social, environmental, and other effects of the plan or highway location or design and various alternatives which were
raised during the hearing or which were otherw ise considered." Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605,
§ 135, 84 Stat. 1713, 1734.
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The Committee leadership reiterated this understanding on the Senate floor.35
Transportation Secretary Boyd also argued for the §4(f) formulation on the House side:
The [House] report indicates the Committee's belief that the perspective in decision-making
should be broadened, not narrowed, and that preservation for use is sound conservation
philosophy. . . . It is in this spirit that the [Department of Transportation] proposes to
administer the Act. . . . The department is aware of no problems which have arisen in the
course of administering the present language, nor does the Committee report refer to any.
We think the present language of 4(f) is a clear statement of Congressional purpose.36
The House nonetheless chose the words of §138 over those of §4(f). While the Senate prevailed on
this issue in the ensuing conference, choosing the §4(f) formulation, it would be hard to take its
victory as a repudiation of what the Administration had advised Congress it was doing. This was
the course the Administration had urged on both houses.
The Managers on behalf of the House included the following statement in their conference report
to their colleagues:
This amendment of both relevant sections of law is intended to make it unmistakably clear
that neither section constitutes a mandatory prohibition against the use of the enumerated
lands, but rather, is a discretionary authority which must be used with both wisdom and
reason. The Congress does not believe, for example, that substantial numbers of people
should be required to move in order to preserve these lands, or that clearly enunciated local
preferences should be overruled on the basis of this authority.37
In the Senate, discussion of this aspect of the conference report focused on preserving the Secretary's
discretion to disapprove local choices that ran counter to the statute, not the possibility that external
enforcement might ensue.38 As would be surprising if it expected the latter, Congress did not explore
the consequences of its choice either for ongoing projects or for other strongly held values at stake
in highway construction – in particular, for the urban relocation of residents of poor and/or minority
neighborhoods that was the principal focus of the legislation at hand. Significantly, President
Johnson felt that the statute, as a whole, was a defeat of his campaign for highway beautification and
amenity at the hands of highway interests.39 The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 became effective
August 24, 1968.
PLANNING I-40 FOR MEMPHIS
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114 CON G. REC. 19,530 (1968). When Senator Jackson sought assurance from Senator Randolph, Chairman
of the Public Works Committee, that his Committee had determined not to modify Section 4(f) and to uphold the
previously expressed intent of the Congress on the question of protection of parks, Senator Randolph gave that assurance
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The Memphis Chamber of Commerce
The business community of Memphis had high stakes in I-40 and the progressive change it
represented. When thoughts about that highway first emerged in the 1950's, their city lacked any
circumferential road system – indeed, any highway system at all. For decades, Memphis had been
administered under the watchful eye of E. H. Crump, an unusually effective machine politician
whose taste for low taxes led him to ignore infrastructure and planning. 40 His hand-picked Mayor
from 1949 to 1953, Watkins Overton, for whose distant relative Overton Park had been named, was
also a bitter opponent of planning and reform. It was not until 1953, when Overton was succeeded
by Frank Tobey and Crump's grip on the city was beginning to fail, that the city began to think about
the limited access freeways other southern cities had already begun to construct. In the effort to
catch up, the city commissioned a thorough planning study by Harlan Bartholomew & Associates,
a St. Louis firm, in 1953. With Crump’s death the following fall, a civic reform group that had been
working with progressive business leaders to develop support for planning and urban development
emerged as the most important political force among the white voters of the city. In 1955, shortly
after submission of the multivolume comprehensive plan, they would elect their leader, Edmund
Orgill, as mayor.
For the limited access roads that were among its recommendations, the Harlan Bartholomew plan
proposed the familiar pattern of a circumferential ring, with north-south and east-west expressway
components to carry traffic to and through the commercial center (and Overton Park). Although the
Chamber of Commerce was not particularly concerned with the displacements these projects would
cause, one could note that they mostly passed through relatively undeveloped or African-American
population areas, including a park used by the African-American community; the east-west
expressway was the one element of the proposed system that crossed the white residential area of
Memphis (as well as Overton Park). For the business community, having the new Mississippi River
bridge and the central artery were the central concerns – even before the city's effective center had
moved away from the river, and competing shopping and commercial areas had sprung up along the
circumferential. Over the years, as threats to the proposal rose and fell – at one point, for example,
a major hospital threatened to move out of concern for the impact of vibrations, noise and fumes41
– they were among its most consistent and vociferous supporters. Overton Park, as such, figured
little in their support; perhaps some valued the marginally shorter commute they might expect from
homes in the eastern suburbs, but this does not surface in the materials. Their central concern was
the health of the downtown financial and commercial community, as well as containing the costs of
the enterprise as they understood them.
The business community remained, as well, a force for “modern government” for Memphis. It
supported a number of civic reform initiatives, beginning with the ouster of the Crumb regime and
ending for our purposes in 1966. On the eve of the Overton Park controversy, Memphians voted to
replace the existing five-member City Commission with a Mayor and a thirteen-member City
Council, whose members would be elected by representative districts to strictly legislative capacities
rather than by the city as a whole to executive responsibilities (as the commissioners had been). In
1966, too, the flight of conservative southern white voters from the Democrats to the Republicans
led to the election of Memphis's first Republican Member of Congress, Dan Kuykendall. The
subsequent municipal elections, in 1967, elected a collection of political tyros – "a business oriented
40
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group . . . moderately wealthy and middle class," only one of whose members had previously held
elective office – as the first City Council.42 Racial polarization in the mayoral elections that year,
however, had also resulted in the election of former Mayor Henry Loeb, a well-established opponent
of civil rights; this set the stage for the 1968 Memphis garbagemen's strike that tragically culminated
in the assassination of the Reverend Martin Luther King. The proposal to build an expressway
through Overton Park received its final municipal imprimatur, for our purposes, when this new City
Council took time from its consideration of that agonizing and racially charged strike to meet twice
with Federal Highway Administrator Lowell Bridwell and, after vacillating, to assure him that the
proposal had the city's support.
The African-American Community of Memphis
The feelings of Memphis’s sizeable African-American community about Overton Park do not
often emerge from the available materials, but they can be imagined. Before segregation was
disestablished – that is, during much of the run-up to the dispute – the park was generally available
to whites only; black citizens could visit its Zoo on Tuesdays. Professor Lucie White sensitively
imagined the feelings of a
Memphis school girl ... of African descent. If this girl were visiting Overton Park, it would
be a Tuesday ... . This girl's school bus would drive from a segregated school on the black
fringes of the city – fringes that were already crossed by a freeway. It would pass the elegant
homes where her own people, forty percent of the city's population, worked as maids and
yardmen, until finally, in the center of this area, it would enter Overton Park. As I imagined
this ... girl taking that journey, I imagined mixed-up feelings of bitterness and awe. Although
she loved the park, she also hated what its preservation would represent. Therefore, I
imagined her spitefully, if also silently, allying with the bulldozers to fight those privileged
groups who would suffer neither highways nor Negroes anywhere near their neighborhoods,
and who knew how to work the system to get their way. I imagined her concluding that
unless some of the freeways were built in the Overton Parks of the world – at least as a
precedent – all of them would end up in her own back yard.43
Indeed, the other Memphis elements of the Interstate system were in her back yard, and a park she
might have used had been taken without evident concern for park or community values. The
principal alternative to Overton Park investigated, the one using railroad rights of way and old creek
beds north of the park, would have had a major impact on a stable mixed residential area in
Memphis, one of the few places where its two communities lived together. Unmentioned by the
planners, this characteristic of the area became, for some, an important reason to resist moving I-40
away from the park.
By the time the Overton Park issue emerged sharply, black Memphians would have learned of
problems associated with the routing of I-40 through Nashville – an episode that reached the Sixth
Circuit in 1967.44 There, the proposed route would have separated the campuses of two traditionally
African-American faculties, Fisk University and Meharry Medical College, from the nearby black
community of North Nashville. In addition to disrupting their classes with its noise and diverted
42
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traffic, it would have destroyed a public park used largely by blacks. Accompanying street changes
the city proposed would have closed a substantial segment of Jefferson Street, site of Nashville's
most successful black merchant community. According to the plaintiffs in litigation challenging
these plans, preliminary indications of I-40's route had not revealed these dramatic impacts. As
originally proposed in 1956, the route had been a direct east-west road traversing railroad tracks, rail
yards, and a few white-owned retail businesses. This was the only portion of the initial plan not
finally approved in preliminary meetings among state and local officials; by the time the proposal
was made public for the federally required hearing in 1957, it had been mysteriously rerouted to
swing north through the black community.45 As would not be the case in Memphis, the required
public hearing was – perhaps intentionally – obscure; notices were sent only to the County Judge,
to the Mayor, and to a few post offices located in white neighborhoods. The notices were unspecific
about the route, and they gave as the date for the hearing May 14, 1957; in fact, the hearing occurred
May 15.46 While the Ellington court concluded that the location issue had in fact been prominent
in Nashville politics for over a decade,47 it also agreed with the district court's conclusion that "the
consideration given to the total impact of the link of I-40 on the North Nashville community was
inadequate."48 And while the Ellington court found on the merits that claims of racial discrimination
had not been well enough proved to require reversing the lower court's denial of preliminary relief,49
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it would not have been hard for a black Memphian to believe that the state highway department had
been a party to manipulations producing an outcome improperly favoring dominant white interests
over black interests; another contemporary account, this in one of the several "superhighway exposé"
books of the time, presented Nashville officials as having refused to specify the exact route until
construction bids were sought in 1967.50
In any event, as the Overton Park controversy reached its climax in local politics, the dominating
concern of the Memphis black community was not how the city, state and federal government would
accommodate transportation needs with an unfamiliar urban amenity. It was how the new city
government would deal with a racially polarizing garbagemen’s strike, a strike that would end in
tragedy and outrage when the Reverend Martin Luther King was assassinated in Memphis, just as
the City Council took its final vote to accept the routing of I-40 through the park.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
Professor White imagined, alongside the young African American woman evoked above, a young
white girl who
had grown up in the elegant residential enclave bordering Overton Park. This young girl had
many wonderful memories of the park -- of hikes through the acres of virgin woodland,
family picnics, visits to the zoo. I could imagine her feeling not just saddened, but threatened
by the prospect of a freeway cutting through her park, even a freeway unobtrusively
depressed below street level for most of its length. It would not just be a question of noise
and pollution. Rather, a freeway invading Overton Park would rupture her entire social
world. As the 1950s became the 1960s, the tranquility of that world was beginning to
unravel – first with the desegregation of the park itself; then with the civil rights movement
and the urban riots; and finally with the assassination of Martin Luther King in Memphis;
and the enactment, a week later, of a sweeping federal Fair Housing Act. To this young girl,
the prospect of a freeway through Overton Park was not just a tradeoff of trees for asphalt;
it signified the threat that she felt all around her ..., a threat to her very way of life.51
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Although planning began earlier (the first federal route approval came as early as November 1956),52
that threat became manifest in April 1957, when Memphis newspapers first printed maps that clearly
showed the proposed routes I-40 would take through the city, including the park, and indicated that
the public would get its chance to speak out on routing issues. There followed a well-attended
meeting of the City Commissioners to hear citizen questions and views (Overton Park was only one
of the subjects), and the formation of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park (CPOP).53
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park was a citizen’s action group in familiar form, created in
outrage and enduring for the time it took finally to defeat the project. Its papers, preserved in the
Shelby County Library in Memphis, reveal an organization that was never very large, and had
dwindled considerably by the late ‘60's.54 Certainly some of the initial support for Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park (CPOP) – remnants of the old, anti-planning Crumb machine, for example
– seemed to be in the defensive mode Professor White’s narrative suggests; former mayor Overton
was among its more active early members. As the following narrative suggests, its leaders were
resourceful and imaginative in their efforts to marshal political support against I-40; they did not turn
to litigation for over a decade. Neither, however, were they willing to accept the compromises and
modifications that their political efforts in fact produced. CPOP’s core membership was
unmistakably animated by a passion for the park; little else could explain their energy and
perseverance in the face of an establishment – local, state, and federal – that was willing to bend, but
not to deviate from its path.
In its initial efforts, CPOP enjoyed partial success. By mid-May, the city was urging the state
to change the expressway's route through the park to reduce its impact by aligning it with the existing
bus road.55 In September, William Pollard, Harlan Bartholomew’s chief engineer in Memphis,
appeared before a hearing of the City Commission to present a design that he hoped would
accommodate the Commissioners' concerns. It proposed a roadway depressed below the surface,
fenced, with provision for pedestrian crossings, and landscaped to reduce its impact. He was met
by more than 300 protesting citizens, unwilling to hear him speak or to entertain any plan that would
use the park; they had gathered more than 10,000 signatures on petitions opposed to use of the park
– the apparent highwater mark in numerical support for the opposition. Fred Ragsdale, head of the
city's traffic advisory commission, strongly urged limiting the expressways to the circumferential
highway.56
On the surface, accommodation was all that those favoring the park route seemed willing to
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offer. Mayor Orgill, presiding, expressed annoyance: "[A]ny group of people who will sit down and
listen to how the expressways were planned, the reasons they were placed where they are, will be
just as convinced as I am."57 Perhaps he experienced the meeting as an echo of his earlier struggles
with then-Mayor Overton and the Crump machine whether to have such planning at all.
Nonetheless, the Commission asked Harlan Bartholomew to restudy the railway/creekbed route; it
reported back a continued preference for the park route – although not for the reasons that later
generated the greatest resistance from the local black community, its neighborhood impacts.58
The Overton Park controversy then receded from public prominence59 until the federally
prescribed hearing for the segment of the east-west route, including Overton Park, in 1961. The
Commissioner himself conducted that hearing in light of the controversy, with Harlan
Bartholomew’s engineer Pollard presenting a strictly economic analysis of the route. Several
hundred crowded the auditorium. Downtown Association speakers were supportive, but on the
whole the largely white and well-dressed audience wanted to ask "what we can do to stop you from
going through the park?"60 Within two weeks, Mayor Loeb had met with CPOP and endorsed the
east-west expressway as the route that "will help Memphis more than any other expressway
segment."61 A month later, the City Engineer is reported to have said that the controversial route
would be built last, to see if it was in fact required; "We've tried to get every other possible route
approved by the engineers, and they have made at least 32 studies to avoid going through Overton
Park, and they found it impossible."62
Controversy subsided until 1964, while construction of other parts of the expressway pushed
forward steadily. In that year, as their completion neared the half-way point, the east-west
57
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expressway issues resurfaced, now in the administration of Mayor William Ingram. The Tennessee
Highway Department hired Buchart-Horn, an engineering firm, to design this segment; this was the
only segment for which the original planners, Harlan Bartholomew, were not hired.63 By late spring,
CPOP had promised an eleventh hour blitz,64 and it seems to have been successful in gaining the
attention of relevant figures: although the City Beautiful Commission ("CBC")65 and local
newspapers66 supported the expressway, others voiced shared concern. The Park Commission, the
Shelby Forest Council, a number of City Commissioners, and Mayor Ingram all said they’d prefer
that Overton Park not be used – although doubtful that change was now possible, and in some cases
satisfied that "every effort" had already been made to find another feasible location.67
CPOP extended its political efforts well past city government. State Highway Commissioner
David Pack (later, Tennessee's Attorney General) first announced that the state planned "to push
right ahead," 68 but then (apparently under instructions from Tennessee Governor Frank Clement,
who was seeking the Democratic nomination for U.S. Senator) wrote CPOP that his office would
study all possible alternatives before going ahead. He did this in the face of pressure from the
Memphis Chamber of Commerce and the Downtown Association for an immediate start on what was
already a considerably delayed project.69 His public vacillation continued through the campaign
season;70 newpaper reports asserted that, in an early fall meeting with Governor Clement and CPOP,
the Governor had said that he "didn't mind saying . . . in front of the engineers [that he] would prefer
to keep the expressway out of the park."71 The same story indicates that the controversy had reached
the head of the Federal Bureau of Public Roads ("BPR"), Rex Whitton, who had said that the
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necessary studies had not yet been finalized, and that no effort would be spared to see that all
considerations were properly balanced. Within a few weeks, CPOP was meeting with mid-level
BPR officials and the engineers from Buchart-Horn to discuss possible changes – albeit changes to
reduce the road's impact rather than reroute it altogether. By mid-winter, CPOP had approached
Tennessee Senator Albert Gore, Sr., prompting him to ask Mr. Whitton for a status report after the
BPR visit. The response, which he forwarded to CPOP, ascribed support for the Overton Park
routing to city officials, but indicated the matter had not yet been resolved at the state level.
CPOP’s engagement with city politics reappeared after Memphians had agreed to replace their
City Commission with Mayor and City Council.72 It attempted without apparent success to make
the expressway an overt issue in the 1967 Council elections, sending each of the more than one
hundred candidates a questionnaire about his or her attitude. Only a third responded;73 the one
candidate for the Council who made opposition to the road a centerpiece of his campaign lost.
Nonetheless, once the elections were over CPOP quickly sought meetings with the new Council to
explore the possibility of change.74
At the same time, CPOP had been actively seeking intervention in Washington. By this time,
§4(f) was in force, and the Johnson administration had given prominence to highway beautification
– a diversion from Vietnam, perhaps, but from CPOP’s perspective certainly a welcome one. The
Senate Public Roads Committee opened hearings into urban highways in November 1967, with
Overton Park identified as a trouble spot from the outset. In early December, Representative
Kuykendall announced that Highway Administrator Bridwell would be visiting Memphis, and asked
for reexamination of the route.75 CPOP's indefatigable secretary Anona Stoner – older than Prof.
White’s young schoolgirl but surely just as passionate about the park – repeatedly wrote Secretary
of Transportation Boyd and Administrator Bridwell. Bridwell now responded that "I have spent
some time looking into the issues . . . and reviewing the files . . . [and] plan to visit Memphis to take
a first-hand look at the situation and discuss the problem with interested citizens and State and city
officials."76
Bridwell's first visit (overall, at least the third visit that a ranking federal highway official had
made) would eventually occur in mid-February; in the two months intervening, proponents and
opponents jockeyed for position. In January, CPOP and other interested opponents had the first of
two meetings with the new Council to express their views, and CPOP's Chair, Arlo Smith, wrote
Bridwell that it hoped for a private audience with him, at which CPOP, rather than Mayor Loeb,
would control the presentation made:
The new Mayor Henry Loeb is one of the most obstinate proponents . . . although this was
not a campaign issue of his. . . . The new council members are strongly influenced by the
mayor, and anxious to get along with him, and they are unaware of the factual information
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as we have long been in a news blackout, in all media, relative to such information.77 . . .
Previous "hearings" . . . have been chaired and controlled by persons refusing to hear or
"have time for" further consideration. . . . [Attending a meeting between you and the
Council] will not enable us to fairly present to you our well documented factual information.
We will still need a minimum of an hour with you, privately, for our case to be presented.
If you wish a joint meeting with the council and the mayor, it should follow our private
meeting with you. . . . We are anxious to have you visit Memphis as soon as possible,
because frantic efforts are being made to . . . skip-buy property to show "it is too late to
change" now.78
On February 13 – the day on which the Memphis garbagemen's strike began – CPOP spent half
an hour with the Council presenting its case. The next day it was among seventy-five persons both
opposing and favoring the road who participated in a four-hour hearing with federal Administrator
Bridwell. On March 5, it seemed finally to have won its case; the City Council unanimously adopted
a resolution expressing its preference that another route be used – if necessary the northern boundary
of the park. But CPOP feared, with reason as matters eventuated, that the Council might not hold
its ground.79 During the weeks following, CPOP and the proponents of the road contended for the
attention of the Council and Administrator Bridwell. For its part, CPOP kept up a steady stream of
letters, keeping Bridwell informed of local machinations such as the Highway Department's efforts
(as CPOP saw them) to force the issue by removing tenants from housing on the approaches to either
side of the park.80 Similarly, it wrote privately to the chair of the Council to be sure he was aware
of Bridwell's eagerness, as it averred it had learned, to have the Council's help in "reaffirming its
stand against the Expressway."81 On April 4, a few days after the strikers' riots and minutes before
Martin Luther King, Jr. would be assassinated at the Lorraine Motel, the City Council reversed its
course and approved the route through the park.
This resolution resulted from an April 3 meeting between the Council and Administrator
Bridwell. CPOP was excluded from this meeting, although the press, state and city representatives,
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and a representative of Harlan Bartholomew & Associates were present. CPOP knew that in the
1961 state hearing, audience comments, largely opposing the route, somehow had not been recorded;
a similar mishap had befallen the Nashville I-40 process. It got Bridwell to promise that the April
3 meeting would be recorded; but no sooner had the meeting concluded than he called CPOP Chair
Smith to report that the City Council's recording equipment had been, embarrassingly, inoperative.82
An anguished letter of April 6 from Smith to Bridwell refers to television clips he had seen of
Bridwell explaining the diversion costs of the outside-the-park alternatives and to reports he had
received from a councilman about Bridwell's "very fair . . . magnificent presentation." What, Smith
wanted to know, were the alternatives discussed? Did Bridwell realize with how much regret
Council members had now cast their votes favoring the park route? Wasn't this all the product of
permitting the state to continue purchases that basically forced the city's hand?83 At about the same
time, CPOP's energetic secretary, Anona Stoner, was writing Secretary Udall of the Department of
the Interior, seeking to enlist his aid.84
CPOP would continue its fight, as indeed the litigation amply demonstrates; but it may be best
at this point to turn to the engagement of other participants.
State Highway Officials
State highway officials (and perhaps, as well, other members of Tennessee government) were
the most persistent advocates of putting I-40 through Overton Park, and doing so for the professional
reasons of highway engineers – it would be the cheapest route, the most direct route, and the route
that served the most traffic.85 It is worth emphasizing that, as a legal matter, state offices and state
officials were the persons primarily responsible for the routing decisions made, and for conducting
any public hearings that concerned those decisions. Their relationship with the federal government
was as a supplicant for funds; federal financial support would cover 90% of the expense of the
roadway if federal approvals could be won. What the federal government might or might not be
approving, however, were decisions made by the state of Tennessee and its Highway Commission.
The year 1965 saw a series of events involving state officials and politicians that suggest both
the consistent pressure from its highway establishment for resolution, and the political pressures
being brought to bear in Nashville. Perhaps, Commissioner Pack intimated, the new bridge over
the Mississippi would not be built in Memphis if the east-west leg were not constructed, and the
funds would be used to speed construction of another bridge further to the north. But perhaps, also,
building the expressway would lead a major Memphis facility, St. Jude's Hospital, to move out of
the city, as its leadership began to express fears that vibrations and fumes from the highway would
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interfere with medical care.86 Aware that this dispute was becoming a national symbol of a
viewpoint with which Pack claimed some sympathy, 87 and with the results of a new alternative route
study again demonstrating the economic advantages of the park route in hand,88 Commissioner Pack
announced two modifications at the end of July: construction measures would be taken to protect
the hospital, and the design of the projected interchange on the eastern edge of Overton Park would
be altered to remove most of it from the park. There would, however, be no departure from the route
as a whole.89
Commissioner Pack's correspondence with Administrator Whitton makes plain that his purpose
was to recognize the opposition to the road, to go a substantial distance toward meeting it, but to
keep the road in Overton Park.90 He led the resistance to design changes in the park that would add
to I-40's expense. In January 1966, after personally inspecting the route and possible alternates,
Administrator Whitton wrote him to "reaffirm our previous approval" of the Overton Park route,
subject however to "the most exacting efforts to assure a finished product which is in keeping with
the area and future Park usage" as "a condition to our action. We ask that the design be subjected
to continuous evaluation by qualified architectural landscape personnel . . . fully coordinated with
the appropriate city park officials."91 Pack's reported and peculiarly ungracious reaction was to
respond that "the route through the park probably will not be depressed, as was earlier considered.
Rather, the plan is to have the route on grade and to make full use of landscaping."92 This reaction
must have suggested to those Memphians who wanted to have the road, but protect the park, that the
engineers in Nashville could not be fully trusted.
Nineteen sixty-seven brought a new governor and a new highway commissioner, who soon
indicated that after reconsidering the route and its alternatives they were convinced that "the route
through the park is the most direct and the most economically feasible."93 Not long after, D. Jack
Smith, the member of the Tennessee House of Representative serving the Overton Park district,
introduced in the House a bill to prohibit the spending state funds to build a road through anypublic
park in Shelby County – i.e., to block I-40's routing through Overton Park.94 To the Press-Scimitar,
the bill illustrated the evils of the small election districts against which it had recently inveighed, by
putting "a legislator under pressure to put the wishes of his particular district ahead of the welfare
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of the whole community."95 Representative Smith's proposed statute appears to have sunk into
oblivion.
In the wake of the Overton Park decision, consistent with their previous efforts, state highway
officials continued to push not only for the route through the park, but for the least expensive design
elements.
Federal Highway Officials
Although this might not be the impression readers would get from the Overton Park opinion,
federal highway officials were at the other end of the spectrum from those in the states,. We have
seen already how often instructions to attend to amenities like parks came, first, from the Bureau of
Public Roads and then, after its creation in 1966, from the Department of Transportation. Of course,
as prior pages will also have suggested, there was an evolution, as the fact and impacts of the
interstate system became more evident. But whether as a result of their dealings with Congress –
which as we have seen was almost yearly sending signals of increasing complexity and responsibility
about the road-planning enterprise – or simply as the product of a somewhat different kind of
professionalization of their bureaucratic function, federal highway officials were more likely to see
the larger picture, the contending interests, the need for accommodation and compromise.
Rex Whitton, for example, one of earlier federal administrators to deal with the Overton Park
issue, was no enemy of parks. Within six months of his flurry of correspondence in the fall of 1964
and subsequent visit to Memphis,96 the BPR had issued a circular promoting the protection and
improvement of public recreational resources in the road-building process. Not long after (following
a BPR conference calling on highway planners to relate transportation plans and programs to social
and community values97 and before legislation on the subject), Administrator Whitton wrote that the
Bureau now required states to give "full consideration to the preservation" of parklands and to
demonstrate their responsiveness to suggestions made.98 Although doubtless other pressures
sometimes contributed to rather quick and dirty decision-making by the federal bureaucracy, it was
sending clear signals that these considerations were valid and valued. Recall in this respect
Administrator Whitton’s 1966 direction to State Highway Commissioner Pack to make "the most
exacting efforts to assure a finished product which is in keeping with the area and future Park usage"
as "a condition to our action.”99
Lowell Bridwell, Whitton’s successor (and the first administrator of highway programs for the
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new Department of Transportation), was also attentive to park issues.100 Indeed, this was true of
DOT officials generally – albeit in the context of a general and continuing effort to hear, not from
state highway bureaucrats but from city politicians. The creation of the Department of
Transportation had produced typically complex, not dichotomous, change. Certainly, in creating the
new Department with its multiple responsibilities, Congress had repudiated the almost mechanical
"cost-benefit" calculations of economic advantage that had marked early highway planning. Planners
must now consider more than the quantifiable issues of time, cost, anticipated traffic burden, and
miles. To demand that the not-readily-quantified be considered, however, is not to choose which
such value is to be favored; the political history gave the Department little reason to think that
Congress and the President had required more than that they require local processes to consider these
questions in the first instance, under some supervision to see that park values were seriously
weighed. Neighborhood disruption, the requirement of resettling, the erection of racial barriers and
interference with racial integration entailed values as ineffable as the use of parks, and the new
statutes (like the political temper of the times) were emphatic about these values too. Intuitively, one
would believe that the first Secretary of Transportation and his associates would have a reasonable
understanding of the political play.
What one sees in the relevant federal materials, then, is sensitivity, but not an understanding that
any one of these ineffable values – park values in particular – must be controlling. Many elements
of the then developing Interstate Highway network were in contentious play, often in the context of
local politics and city planning issues generally. 101 Internally, the issues of §4(f) and its initial
seeming inconsistency with the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966 were debated. Yet no one, not
even those responsible for its environmentalist bureaucracy, imagined that in problematic contexts
the park value would be regarded as absolute or presumptively controlling.102 And one can see that
this is the course the Department followed, without resistance from the Congress.
Certainly this was how the new Department and Administrator saw the issues concerning the use
of Overton Park. Thus, in connection with his visits in the winter of 1967-68, a DOT Assistant
Secretary, referring specifically to the Overton Park controversy and Bridwell's coming visit, told
Memphis Kiwanis that Memphians would have a "much greater voice" in making the transportation
decisions that affect their lives. "We [DOT] feel you should make this decision because you are best
equipped to make it -- because you will know what will make your commerce thrive and what will
make the lives of your people more meaningful."103
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Administrator Bridwell must have been aware that the course of action he took that winter
reopened the siting issue and thus permitted the new standards of §4(f) to apply. He was under no
apparent legal obligation to do this. On his first visit, the day after CPOP had spent half an hour
presenting its case to the new Council,104 he briefly met the Mayor, the Chairman of the Council and
representatives of the Downtown Association together with the press. He then made a tour of the
park and the expressway route, and returned to the federal building for a four-hour hearing at which
CPOP and others both opposing and favoring the road made presentations; about seventy-five were
in attendance. He left the city indicating that he had a decision to make in "several days"; that "we
have had all the studies on this that we need"; that if he didn't act, the expressway would be built;
and that "as of right now, the city of Memphis' official position is in favor of I-40 and going through
Overton Park."105
The City Council changed that position with its March 5 resolution seeking rerouting.106 In
response, he let it be known that he needed a specific, reasonably well-developed alternative routing
proposal; the newspapers presented this in a manner that made him appear impatient – possibly
threatening the east-west expressway project and the Mississippi River bridge.107 Yet underlying the
stories was not only Bridwell's clear understanding that the requirements of §4(f) would now have
to be met if the route were to go through Overton Park, but also his acknowledgment of an
enforcement device within the Executive branch that would serve to keep the Department honest in
its approach to the provision. Secretary of the Interior Udall had been charged by a President notably
committed to highway beautification with assuring the enforcement of the new law, and would not
likely be satisfied unless the Council were to take a positive position.108
Annoyed that the Administrator would air the controversy in the pages of newspapers already full
of criticism over the garbagemen's strike,109 the Council first discussed the matter with him in a
conference call, and then persuaded him to meet them at Memphis airport on April 3. He remarked
on the eve of that meeting – which, as we have seen, produced Council approval of the route110 – that
the Overton Park route and a similar park crossing in San Antonio are two "hot spots" being
eyed closely by the conservation interests for compliance with a 1966 federal law limiting the
use of park property for expressways. What we have in Memphis is a question of conflicting
values . . . . It is preferable for the City of Memphis, through the mayor and council, to decide
what values are to be applied. If city officials don't do this, then I have the obligation of doing
it. But I would much rather be guided by local officials. This doesn't mean of course, that I
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will accept any kind of guidance from them. It must be reasonable, rational and prudent.111
Later arguments would question how open Bridwell was to reconsideration, whether he had not
extorted the Council's agreement by monetary threats or perhaps misrepresentation. Yet although
contemporary newspaper accounts and correspondence give some support to this view, it is hard to
square with the general course of action he took toward Overton Park in particular, and toward his
responsibilities in the new Department in general. His DOT administration repeatedly emphasized
its openness to the consideration of multiple values, and took a variety of steps (including the legally
unnecessary step of reopening the Overton Park controversy) to implement that attitude. It knew it
was acting under close political oversight. For the Administrator to make two trips in a two-month
period personally to review a three-mile segment of public road was an extraordinary commitment
of effort, one not readily made simply for show. More than a decade had transpired since the route
had been fixed; it had been reconsidered again and again under political impetus not readily
discredited as a comprehensive and continuing sham. And life had continued. The issues were close;
as the remainder of Memphis expressway system grew and as citizens and businesses began to
appreciate and accommodate themselves to its changes, commitments had been made that over time
narrowed options and hardened attitudes.
On April 19, Administrator Bridwell announced his decision to reaffirm the earlier federal
approvals to direct I-40 through Overton Park. As with earlier federal approvals, this one came with
instructions – now undergirded by federal statutory requirements – that "in the actual design stages
we will try to minimize as much as possible the impact of the highway on the park facilities."112 And
it came with evidence of political blessing; simultaneously, Governor Ellington and Representative
Kuykendall announced their acceptance of the decision.113 Secretary Boyd wrote to CPOP Chairman
Arlo Smith in explanation of the decision, saying “Now that the decision has been made on the
specific alignment of the route, I have asked Mr. Bridwell ... to develop a number of specific design
alternatives to minimize damage to the park and its facilities.”114 As would be lost on neither CPOP
nor, eventually, the Justices of the Supreme Court, this letter neither used the statutory “feasible and
prudent alternative” formula nor asserted that Secretary Boyd had himself made the decision he was
purporting to explain.
Within a month, Administrator Bridwell and Transportation Secretary Boyd would be testifying
in the congressional hearings that led to enactment of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. As we
have seen, with the Department’s encouragement, this Act reiterated the §4(f) formulation.115 In his
testimony, Administrator Bridwell had detailed both the Department's understanding of and support
for §4(f), and the course of action it had followed in a number of controversial highway decisions,
specifically including Overton Park. "Unfortunately," he told them, "there is no legislative history
on [§4(f),] so there is no real guidance from the Congress in interpreting the act. Therefore, we are
faced with the bare words, 'if prudent and feasible,' and if it is not prudent and feasible, to minimize
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the damage."116 The Department had been experimenting with a variety of approaches to section 4(f)
in a number of urban settings where conflict had arisen over conflicting values: redevelopment,
community displacement, racial justice, "white flight," business district reorganization, environmental
and historic preservation, and so forth.
He described an approach that relied heavily on the injection of park values into local hearing
processes where issues such as neighborhood integrity and dislocations would also be considered.
Rather than treat route decisions as primarily for the Washington bureaucracy, it accorded substantial
decisional responsibility to properly instructed and supported local officials. The statutory
recognition that there might be no "prudent" alternative route permitted a balancing of competing
interests – safety, neighborhood integrity, and the avoidance of large-scale urban relocations.
Although "a few years ago" federal officials had emphasized both "developing local planning
competence . . . and . . . removing it from the vagaries of the political system," he now acknowledged
that the professionals had proved insufficiently responsive to community values;117 hence the
Department was seeking to promote greater community involvement in the development of the
transportation plans, to make professional planners and engineers more responsive to community
needs and goals.118 Bridwell told the Subcommittee that approximately twenty-five cases pending
in the Department raised "fundamentally . . . the same problem, namely, the conflict of community
values."119
I reject the idea that we have an either/or situation before us, either/or in the sense that you
must choose one as distinct from the other and that you cannot have both. In other words,
either you can't have highway or you can't have housing or you can't have a highway and you
can't have a park, because in my opinion if we do our job, do it thoroughly, do it right, and
116
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you give us the tools to work with there isn't a reason in the world why we can't accomplish
both.120
Bridwell told the committee that in Memphis the controversy involved a park that was "extremely
attractive and highly used," and that the long-standing plans to build the highway through it had
culminated "recently in considerable controversy over whether the park could or should be used" for
the highway.121
Once again this 4(f) portion of the Department of Transportation Act came into play. In effect
it required us to do the same type of thing that we did in New Orleans,122 go back and look at,
is there another feasible and prudent location.
Again experimenting we handled this one a little bit differently. We went to the city council
of Memphis and we said, "Yes, there are alternatives. . .". We told them that a highway could
be built through the area on almost any conceivable line that they could pick, that
engineeringly [sic] it was feasible . . . We went through this for approximately [three and a
half] hours in which we left it completely in the hands of the city council to choose anything
they wanted to choose, and after several days the city council voted to stick with the original
line through the park.123
Bridwell said he and the City Council had discussed four alternatives and the disruptions each would
cause, and that he had put to them the issue of priorities. Many sociological factors, that are not
particularly susceptible to quantification "in our ordinary use of the word 'quantification' have been
and are being taken into account and without any question increasingly so now and in the recent
past."124 Although some of the contending community values in Memphis could be measured, some
could not be, and none could be measured in a "completely satisfactory sense." Nor could hearings
be relied upon to supply a resolution. Witnesses who appeared in Memphis hearings, as elsewhere,
had been critical of the decision to go through the Park; but those witnesses were understandably
expressing a preference for "their own personal set of values" in a situation of inevitable conflict.
There is no nice, easy answer to this and there never will be. . . . Anytime there is disruption
120
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to an established pattern in the urban environment there necessarily must be conflicting sets
of values brought into play and some one has to make the decision about which set of values
prevails. The Secretary testified yesterday that except for very unusual circumstances the
decision of the local people would prevail, in the form of the action of the elected
representatives, their mayor, their city council, their appropriate local officials.
That was precisely the reason that we went to the Memphis city council and in effect said,
'Take your choice. You can have anything you want and we won't even as much as tell you
how many dollars it costs because we don't want to influence your decision. You have to
decide on the basis of contending unquantifiable community values.125
His lively dialogue with the Subcommittee sympathetically explored, and did not condemn, the
approach he described. And once these hearings were concluded, the Subcommittee moved
immediately to consider the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968.
To understand the remaining events leading up to the court's decision in Overton Park, it may
suffice merely to sketch the events leading to Secretary Volpe's refusal to revisit the location issue,
and his approval of a design sunk more deeply into the ground than the state wanted, albeit not deep
enough to avoid the impacts the road's opponents feared. As the preceding narratives show, issues
of design to protect the park had been important from at least the hiring of Buchart-Horn to design
the park segment in 1964, and "the most exacting efforts" to protect the park had been a stated
condition of the federal route approval in January 1966, months before the appearance of a statutory
command. The effect of §4(f), however, was to permit the Secretary to force the Tennessee Highway
Department's hand on the question of design; and the effect of section 128, as the Secretary
understood it,126 was to increase the political pressures on this issue. Thus, when in early June of
1968 the Highway Department sought federal approval of its design for the road, which the City
Council had already approved, Bridwell promptly responded with a request that it study a lowered
grade line.127 A September story in the Commercial Appeal made it clear that East-West expressway
construction had been slowed on instructions from Washington to take all possible steps to minimize
damage to the park.128
With the pendency of a presidential election and then the election of Richard Nixon, construction
slowed still further – now, at the initiative of state and city officials who may have understood that
Secretary Boyd was likely to require some form of tunnel129 and hoped a Republican Secretary of
Transportation and Highway Administrator would permit the road to be built at or near ground
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level.130 President Nixon had appointed as his first Secretary of Transportation the former head of
a large construction company, John Volpe. Revised plans for a lowered grade line traveled from the
DOT to the Tennessee Highway Department and back again in February and March of 1969. On May
19, the THD held the required design hearing in Memphis before an audience of about 100. The
principal issue discussed was whether the road should be tunneled under the park; the Department
of the Interior's Bureau of Outdoor Recreation and the National Park and Recreation Association,
among others, strongly supported that option.131 The state's recording of the proceedings once again
failed, although at DOT’s insistence written submissions were obtained.
While design approval was pending, state and city officials took an action that seems strongly to
reflect an understanding that they were obliged to protect park values. Tennessee had permission to
secure the necessary rights of way, and in September it completed that process by purchasing from
the city the 26 acres of Overton Park land it required, for a negotiated price in excess of $ 2,000,000.
The city had undertaken by ordinance to spend all the funds thus received for the acquisition of new
park lands; half the purchase price was immediately committed to purchase a 160-acre golf course
that had long been on the city's list of possible park acquisitions.132 Although the materials consulted
for this study are not explicit that the ordinance was prompted by the requirements of §4(f), one
readily understands the undertaking as a direct means by which park values were protected in the
transaction as a whole.
In the meantime, the opposition to the road once again had reached the Secretary of
Transportation. In July, the Secretary of the Interior wrote to urge the use of a tunnel "to minimize
harm to the park"; 133 a late September story in the Press-Scimitar remarked that Department officials
had ordered a halt to development of I-40, pending Secretary Volpe's return from a European trip;134
and the Commercial Appeal reported first a telephone interview on October 1 indicating that he was
having a "second look [at the route] to see that it is the most feasible location" and then a telegram
that "there is no feasible alternate route" and "therefore my decision, which will be made as soon after
my return as possible, will be related to design considerations in preserving the environmental quality
of the park."135 Those considerations, the story related, included a tunnel in at least some portions of
the park; and documents at the hearing on remand showed that there had been a strong internal
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recommendation to that effect from the Department's Assistant Secretary for Urban Systems and
Environment.136
Secretary Volpe issued his approval of I-40's design November 5, 1969, after the state and city
had agreed to depress most of the roadway by an additional one or two feet, so that even the tops of
trucks would be below ground level at most locations. Whether for reasons of expense or genuine
fear of the consequences of floods and of still water as a breeding ground for mosquitoes, however,
the city remained adamant that the road could not interfere with the natural drainage of Lick Creek,
and so the design provided for the road to rise above grade level to cross the creek.137 One month
later, CPOP filed its lawsuit. Preparation moved fitfully as the case made its way from district court
to Sixth Circuit to the Supreme Court, with the Department prevailing in each venue but the last; the
park itself was untouched, but the approaches could be – and were – prepared.
City Officials
Cities have bureaucracies, too, and it would be a mistake to see the city issues as if they were
solely for the Mayor and Commissioners or, after 1967, the Mayor and City Council. As we have
already seen, the City Engineer was constantly heard from concerning design issues, and a variety of
boards and commissions were consulted or voiced opinions from time to time. Memphis politicians
might easily see the use of Overton Park as a decisive political issue.138 One might even characterize
the course of development leading up to the Council decision of April 5, 1968 as one that increasingly
placed responsibility for this decision on elected City’s officials. As late as 1964, the Mayor and
Commissioners had tended to discuss decisions as ones to be made by state and federal officials, not
them. In 1965, Mayor Ingram could remember no Commission vote on the subject,139 and in an April
vote only he opposed the route.140 On May 2, 1967 (after Representative Smith’s abortive bill in the
Tennessee House of Representatives and BPR’s preliminary approval of the road design), the City
Commission again voted to accept the park route, with Mayor Ingram again in dissent.141
Then came the new form of city government, and Administrator Bridwell’s willingness to reopen
the routing issue in a context to which §4(f) would clearly apply, all the while insisting that what he
wanted to do was to make this a decision for Memphians. As late as January, 1968, the Commercial
Appeal reported that Mayor Loeb (Memphis' Commissioner of Public Works and a supporter of the
road when the plan was first received in the mid-'50's) had assured Tennessee Highway Commissioner
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Speight that the city stood behind use of the park and urged its construction.142 Then came the
February meetings already recounted, and the same paper was able to count at least three City Council
members as "obviously support[ing] relocation, [one, the immediate past president of the Downtown
Association,] to the point of presenting his own alternative route swinging north."143 Perhaps
distracted by the garbagemen’s strike, the Council did not act until its March 5 meeting, when it
unanimously adopted the following resolution:
The Council of the City of Memphis prefers that the Expressway through Overton Park not
be routed in its present proposed location but that the said proper authorities select another
feasible route, with the provision that if no better route can be obtained, the route using the
northern perimeter of Overton Park and the southern part of Northern Parkway be chosen.144
One month later, following Administrator Bridwell’s interventions and their meeting at the Memphis
airport, and in the face of CPOP’s continuing effort to hold on to its seeming victory, the City Council
adopted the following resolution by a vote of 8-2 (three members not participating):
Whereas . . . representatives of the Federal Government and the Department of Highways of
the state of Tennessee have furnished the Council with considerable information and data to
the effect that no other feasible and prudent route is available through Overton Park for
Expressway I-40; and
Whereas the Council has likewise been informed . . . that its action to date has caused no
delay in the building of this part of the expressway, but that further study and hearings could
materially affect the beginning of construction;
Whereas the Council realizes that the construction is very essential for the growth and
progress of the City of Memphis;
Now Therefore be it resolved . . . that the Council finds the route presently designated . . . is
the feasible and prudent location for said route and that the design as presently made is
acceptable to the Council.145
FROM POLITICAL TO JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
The story of Overton Park to this point – specifically, from 1955 to late in 1969 when Secretary
Volpe finally approved the proposed design of I-40 and CPOP sought a lawyer to take its case to the
courts – has been a political story. In this respect, it mirrored the growth of controversies throughout
the country; and so also, one may say, in the turn now from the world of politics to the courts. While
in a sense judicial review (looking backwards) is always a late entrant, litigation did not emerge as
an important control strategy for routing decisions until late in this story. Like the Nashville dispute
earlier recounted,146 lawsuits over routing issues blossomed in the late 60's.
When it began, anti-highway litigation tended to raise straightforward legal issues, rather than
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challenges to the exercise of discretion and judgment. Thus, the Nashville case turned on assertions
of racial motivations, a familiar litigation subject at the time. A challenge to the Three Sisters’ Bridge
in Washington, D.C., ultimately successful on political grounds that would help shape the argument
in Overton Park, began with contentions that municipal officials had simply ignored obligations long
in place in city legislation;147 another lawsuit, challenging construction of an expressway that would
have been constructed on fill placed in the Hudson River alongside Westchester county, alleged
simple noncompliance with statutes requiring permits from the Army Corps of Engineers, that had
never been applied for.148 Overton Park was initially framed in a similar way – whether the Secretary
of Transportation had complied with his statutory obligations, not whether his judgment in exercising
statutorily conferred discretion was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” CPOP’s
attorney’s first brief in the Supreme Court, although also expressing concern how a court could know
what decisions had been taken in the absence of a formal administrative record and opinion, would
assure the Court that
The question here is not, as [respondents] would pose it, the vague and limitless one of
whether the officials have correctly balanced the need to preserve the parks against all other
governmental projects such as health care and welfare. Instead the question is whether those
officials have complied with specific laws governing expenditure of federal monies from the
Highway Trust Fund.149
The Supreme Court’s decision in Overton Park marks the expansion of lawyers’ targets from claims
of ultra vires action to assertions that a discretion decisionmakers possessed had not been reasonably
exercised. The remainder of these pages explore that change.
Lawyers today may find it hard to understand quite how unusual and challenging litigation like
Overton Park was – although, fair to say, the distress created by developments imperiling beautiful,
wealthy neighborhoods as well as their parks helped to animate its development. The ground was
prepared in the latter part of the 1960's, when important decisions opened doors to “public interest”
participation before agencies,150 judicial review,151 and the standing to seek it152 that previously had
seemed closed; one section of the new Department of Transportation Act explicitly subjected DOT’s
decisions to the Administrative Procedure Act, and the APA at least for a time was seen to have
conferred federal subject matter jurisdiction over challenges invoking its review standards.153 Still,
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large questions remained unanswered. Were volunteers, only indirectly affected by highway
development, proper persons to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, when the effects even
of delay might be substantially to increase public costs? Could they be required to post a bond to
cover those additional expenses, should their actions prove unavailing? Were the judgments entrusted
to departmental officials susceptible of judicial review, or rather matters to be treated as having been
committed to their executive discretion – matters citizens could hope to control as they controlled
legislation or executive functioning generally, “in the only way they can be in a complex society, by
their [political] power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rul[ing].”154
The place of politics and political power raised the most delicate questions. One way to
understand these questions is to consider that political influences are often felt outside the usual
formalities of a hearing process, even a process as informal and legislative as accompanied highway
decision-making. If in fact these administrative judgments were subject to the controls of judicial
review, what was the “record” against which they should be measured? How could that record be
prepared and authenticated for judicial use? The processes we have been describing were
fundamentally bureaucratic and political ones. Certainly at that time, no one was thinking about
creating internal records of decision, like those that attend trials. We have been viewing the
development of I-40 as one almost necessarily would, through newspaper accounts, congressional
records, correspondence and other informal means. How could one establish what actually had
happened inside the government, as questions went from desk to desk to their ultimate resolution
there? By, for example, pretrial discovery directed to the myriad government officials who may have
been involved in its creation over the years that a decision moved back and forth within the
bureaucracy?155 And if politics had played a role in the decisions – as, indeed, in highway routing and
design it inevitably did – in what if any circumstances was that an improper element? Could a
reviewing court inquire into political influences as well as the bureaucratic decision path? Must a
decision communicating to a state the DOT’s decision to approve a given route (or design) for 90%
federal funding take the form of an opinion, communicating findings and conclusions? If such
decisions were reviewable, what was the standard of review to be applied, and how should it be
understood?
Although efforts to explore the Department’s decision processes generally failed,156 they
succeeded in protracted and bitter litigation well known to the Justices and also closely coordinated
153
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with the litigation of Overton Park. This lawsuit concerned the Three Sisters’ Bridge proposed to
carry I-66 over the Potomac River from the Virginia suburbs into their hometown, Washington, D.C.;
its later stages turned on a public and highly coercive congressional campaign to force the
construction issue.157 As it would later do in Overton Park, the government had sought to establish
the regularity of its decision in the I-66 litigation by submitting an affidavit attested to by Edgar
Swick. As Deputy Director of Public Roads, Swick could credibly assert familiarity with the
bureaucratic processes before and after the Department’s creation. Ordinarily, government attorneys
could be confident that private parties would be unsuccessful in efforts to peer behind such an
affidavit; the Morgan cases of the early 1940's 158 stood as a nearly impervious barrier. But the public
and extraordinary character of the congressional pressures on the I-66 process opened a door to further
inquiry, and that inquiry produced an account that shadowed the dispute over I-40 in Memphis as
well. The BPR official responsible for preparing Swick’s affidavit “admitted that although the
document purported to explain what the Secretary had done ...it was prepared some two months after
the purported decision and that in fact [the official] had no personal knowledge on which to base the
157
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the Secretary's testimony that his decision was based on the merits of the project and not solely on extraneous
political pressu res. It is true tha t Mr. Vo lpe wa s also interested in securing the re lease o f the rapid transit
appro priations, and that the approval of the bridge led to the release of those fund s. But the Court finds that the
mere fact that the Secretary was aware of this pressure does not invalidate his decision that the Three Sisters
Bridge is an important and necessary part of the Interstate Highway System.
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Overton Park papers.
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memorandum. The court, somewhat incredulous at this procedure, asked [the official]:
‘THE COURT: Is this the only time that you can recall that it was followed, in this case?
‘THE WITNESS: Well, there is something similar to this in I-40 in Memphis, but I am not
just sure of the sequence of events.’”159
The Attorneys for CPOP
Because the I-66 and I-40 disputes were attorney-linked as well as issue-linked, we should turn
now to the young attorneys involved in them. It may be as hard to appreciate the changes in legal
practice occurring in the late 1960's and early 1970's as it is to appreciate the changes in doctrine. As
remarked at the beginning of this essay, the “public interest law” movement’s litigation over
environmental and social issues took shape only in the late 60's and early 70's.160 In 1969, as CPOP
finally contemplated the necessity to go to court, no organized group yet coordinated highway actions;
people found each other by reading the reports. Thus it was not surprising to the attorney in the Three
Sisters’ Bridge litigation, Gerald Norton,161 when CPOP called him to ask if he would represent them;
Charles Newman of Memphis, a 1963 graduate of Yale Law School (who had spent the following
year as law clerk to U.S. District Judge Bailey Brown of Memphis) and a future President of the
Memphis Bar Association, served as local counsel.162 But at the time he was a young associate in the
Washington, D.C. firm of Covington & Burling, barely five years out of law school, and his partners
thought the bridge litigation he was handling pro bono publico was distracting enough. Norton thus
recommended a friend, John Vardaman, Jr. Vardaman would remain lead counsel for CPOP
throughout the litigation. Like Norton, Vardaman was a young associate at a leading Washington
firm, in his case Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering.163 A native Alabaman, he had been law clerk to Justice
Hugo Black in 1965-66 immediately following his graduation from Harvard Law School, and this
experience would stand him in good stead. Since he and Norton coordinated their work closely (as
indeed did many of the young lawyers who were spearheading the growing number of highway cases),
he knew all about the facts emerging in the I-66 litigation.
Vardaman filed CPOP’s action in Washington, D.C., where he and Secretary Volpe had their
offices; but on government motion the case was soon transferred to the Western District of Tennessee,
where Charles Speight, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Highways, was added as a
defendant. Two local residents and two national organizations asserting an interest in the park values

159
Brief in Support of Petitioner’s Application for a Stay Pending Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 26 n. 17 (filed Dec. 3, 1970).
160

See p. 2 above.

161

Telephone conversation with Gerald Norton, July 30, 2004. Mr. Norton graduated from Columbia Law School
in 1964 and clerked on the Second C ircuit before joining Covington & Burling; he subsequently worked in the Solicitor
General’s Office and at the FTC, and is now a senior partner at the Washington firm of Harkins Cunningham LLP
162

Mr. New man is now a senior partner in the Memp his law Firm, Burch, Porter & Johnso n.

163

Vardaman is now senior partne r at W illiams & Connolly, another pro minent W ashington law firm. In August
1970, with decision in Overton Pa rk still pending in the Sixth Circuit, he moved from Wilmer Cutler to the law office
of the noted litigator Edward Bennett Williams as a contract employee; the firm would not become a partnership for
several years, when he would be one of the initial partnership group. It was a considerably smaller office than W ilmer
Cutler, and o ffered a young lawyer m ore o ppo rtunities for litigation and resp onsibility than he had enjoyed there. See
n. 54 above.

-39-

threatened by I-40, joined CPOP as plaintiffs. Appearing before the Honorable Bailey Brown in
District Court, the judge for whom Charles Newman had clerked five years previous, CPOP pressed
arguments of the kind that had already proved successful elsewhere – that the Secretary had failed to
honor straightforward legal obligations. It claimed a variety of alleged procedural defects, including
but not limited to the Secretary’s failure to make formal findings (in effect, his failure to write an
opinion). It characterized §§4(f) and 138 as provisions imposing binding legal requirements that the
Secretary had ignored, rather than as provisions giving him significant discretion whose abuse should
be judicially measured. Under the caselaw of the time, attorney Vardaman could not have expected
any examination of discretion, even if permitted, to be very demanding.
Perhaps the one chance he had of exploring the decision process arose out of the question of
political influence. It appears from a dissent to the subsequent court of appeals decision that during
the discovery period plaintiffs had unsuccessfully moved to depose departmental officials about their
decision process.164 Attorney Norton had by now been successful in deposing the Secretary in the
Three Sisters Bridge case, still in process as Overton Park wound its way through the courts. The
evidence of political coercion to force the building of that bridge was public and unmistakable.165 But
CPOP’s attorneys had no such smoking guns. They failed to persuade Judge Brown that they had
overcome the presumption of regularity that ordinarily protects public officials against such
inquiries,166 and so the motions for summary judgment were decided on the basis of dueling affidavits.
The government filed an extensive account by Edgar Swick, who as Deputy Director of Public Roads
could credibly assert familiarity with the bureaucratic processes, before and after the Department’s
creation.167 Unable to use discovery to build a record in court and lacking any kind of findings
document from the department, plaintiffs were limited to such public accounts of the process as had
appeared in newspapers, to Administrator Bridwell’s testimony in the 1968 Senate Hearings,168 and
to an affidavit submitted by CPOP’s long-time leader, Arlo Smith, asserting on “information and
belief” that the Secretary had “made no finding that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the
use of [Overton Park].”169
On February 26, 1970, Judge Brown denied CPOP’s motion for a preliminary injunction and
granted the government’s motion for summary judgment; he dismissed the complaint.170 Already, the
court noted, “All of the property along the proposed corridor has been condemned, most of the
buildings within the expressway path have been destroyed, and the persons and businesses affected
have been relocated.”171 The bulk of Judge Brown’s opinion dealt with and dismissed the claims of
procedural violation.172 Turning then to the provisions of §§138 and 4(f), he concluded that their
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legislative history ... makes it clear that it was not the intent of Congress to prohibit the
building of an expressway through a park if there was any alternative; rather, by providing that
such should not be done if there is any feasible and prudent alternative, it was the intent of
Congress to avoid the park if, after considering all relevant factors, it is preferable to do so.
In short, it appears to have been the intent of Congress to point up the wisdom of conserving
park lands and the lack of wisdom in routing an expressway through a park because the land
is cheaper and the construction is easier.173
Having once concluded that the statutes gave the Secretary a rather large discretion, he easily found
its exercise not even arguably “arbitrary and capricious.”
We recognize that normally a motion for summary judgment should not be granted if it is
made properly to appear that a determinative fact is in dispute. Here, however, we would not,
at a plenary hearing, have for determination whether there is a feasible and prudent alternative
to the corridor or whether there is a reasonable alternative to the design that would protect the
park more. These are determinations to be made by the Secretary of Transportation, and he
has decided that no such alternatives exist. We could be concerned with the question and only
the question of whether or not the determinations as made were arbitrary and capricious. Our
study of the affidavits and exhibits on file convince us that, from the undisputed facts, we
could never find in this case that, as contended by plaintiffs, such determinations are so wrong
as to be arbitrary and capricious. This being so, we conclude that defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on this issue as well as the other issues in the case.174
This conclusion framed the only issue the Sixth Circuit considered on appeal, “whether there
remains a genuine issue over any material fact in dispute.”175 CPOP’s attorneys would have to have
been “able to show by affidavit, or other evidence, that there is at least a possibility that [they] will
be able to overcome the presumption of regularity.”176 For a majority of the panel, Judge Weick of
the Sixth Circuit writing for himself and Judge Peck, they had been unable to accomplish this. But
CPOP’s attorneys had succeeded, in the Sixth Circuit, in winning their first judicial vote. For Judge
Celebrezze, dissenting, the Secretary’s failure to explain his decision had precluded effective review
or enforcement of his statutory obligations to respect park values. The contending affidavits that took
the place of such an explanation (an explanation Judge Celebrezze would have required) raised
genuine issues of fact respecting which plaintiffs were entitled to both discovery and a trial.
Attorney Vardaman had succeeded in linking the I-40 problem to the ongoing dispute about the
Three Sisters Bridge in one judicial mind; and the result would have been to open the bureaucratic
decision process to examination at trail. Now he filed a petition for rehearing. In denying it, October
30, 1970, the panel majority made the stakes clear: the contending affidavits had raised triable no
issue of fact, it concluded, because Arlo Smith’s “information and belief” that no finding had been
made could not create a triable issue when counterposed to the contrary affidavit of a participant-
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official.177 And the link to the Three Sisters Bridge litigation was unavailing; here there were no such
political pressures as had been alleged in that case, and the barrier to probing the mental processes
of the Secretary set by such decisions as Morgan v. United States178 had not been overcome .
In ordinary course, CPOP’s attorneys would now have had ninety days to compose and file a
petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. But bulldozers and wrecking cranes
were roaring on the verge of the park, clearing the land on both sides right up to its edge. In denying
rehearing, the Sixth Circuit had also denied an application for stay pending a petition for certiorari,
and Tennessee made abundantly clear that it was prepared to begin construction inside the park at
once. The Highway Department opened bids for the contract October 30 and awarded it November
2, the next working day. Vardaman sought a stay from Justice Stewart, the Circuit Justice for the
Sixth Circuit, November 5; Tennessee informed him that it would not await the Justice’s ruling, but
begin work unless affirmatively restrained. On November 6, Justice Stewart issued an order inviting
replies to the stay petition and restraining Tennessee from construction activity in the meantime. Two
weeks later the Court requested briefs on the stay issue, and set the matter for oral argument
December 7.
In many ways, the arguments over the stay seemed to set a tone for the merits. One could begin
with Tennessee’s decision to press forward urgently for construction, when the matter had been
pending in one form or another since 1955. Its exasperation with delay is understandable; yet in
acting on it Tennessee officials risked the impressions that would create. Attorney Vardaman would
represent to the Court that as recently as filing of its petition for rehearing in the Sixth Circuit,
Tennessee’s attorneys had assured that court that no contract would be let nor work begin until the
Supreme Court’s processes had been exhausted.179 The State’s rush to moot the issue opened the door
to suggestions that it (and the Secretary) might have something to hide. Vardaman filled his brief in
support of CPOP’s stay application with questions about the non-existent record, and asserted
parallels to the problems in the Three Sisters’ Bridge litigation.180 Thus could questions about the
record and the actual basis for the Secretary’s decision be planted in the minds of Justices who were
living daily, please recall, with press accounts of the I-66 imbroglio and their own possible interests
in how they would be able to drive from home to work. Even as he expressed surprise that a project
so long in the works needed now to be so urgently pursued, attorney Vardaman acted to meet the
criticism that CPOP was seeking delay for its own sake and imposing significant costs on the state.
The petition for stay, he wrote, could be treated as his petition for certiorari.181
When the Court set the motion for stay for oral argument Monday, December 7, it not only
marked Jack Vardaman’s first return to the Supreme Court since his days as Justice Black’s law clerk;
his boss, Edward Bennett Williams, had been scheduled for the first argument that day,182 and now
– awaiting his own argument – he would be present in that imposing courtroom as a witness to his
new employee’s efforts. The attorney appearing for the Solicitor General’s office at that argument
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was even greener than Vardaman; William Bradford Reynolds had graduated Vanderbilt Law School
just three years earlier, in 1967, and was making his first appearance at the Court183 – a fact that
suggests, as your editor can attest from his own experience, that the office did not see this assignment
as a very important or demanding one. Very likely, given his habitual practice with the young
attorneys in his office, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold – Dean at Harvard Law School when
Vardaman was a student there – was also in the Court that day, watching his young attorney’s first
argument. Once the importance of the case became apparent, Griswold would take the leading role,
and argue on the merits.
In the Supreme Court
Among the scholarly delights of Capitol Hill are the papers of several Supreme Court Justices
kept in the Library of Congress’s manuscript collections, and the complete files of briefs and oral
argument transcripts maintained in the Supreme Court Library. They permit a fuller account of
Overton Park in the Supreme Court than could otherwise be imagined.
Three attorneys appeared at oral argument on the stay; in addition to Mr. Vardaman and Mr.
Reynolds, J. Alan Hanover appeared for the state of Tennessee. In opening his argument, Vardaman
quickly exploited the “rush to judgment” tone Tennessee’s behavior had suggested:
If the respondents are permitted to proceed with this construction they may likely moot this
case. If they do, they will have been successful without ever having filed an answer to the
Petitioners’ complaint, without putting one witness on the witness stand, without having one
other official subject to examination by deposition, but instead rely [sic] on a basis of out of
court litigation affidavits filed in support of a motion for summary judgment.184
Much of the argument, on all sides, was consumed by questions about the timing and extent of
Tennessee’s preparation of the approaches to the park – whether the Court was being asked to “unring
the bell” – about DOT’s actions in relation to its statutory responsibility, and about what the record
was. It reflected awareness about the transitional character of the I-40 issues, in relation to changing
statutory instructions, and some confusion about the timing of departmental decisions in relation to
the effective dates of the new legislative instructions.185 One interchange with Mr. Vardaman
presumably contributed to later developments that would put the government in an unflattering light:
Q Well, would your first point be mooted if [the Secretary] presented in this Court a piece
of paper that made the findings that you say are missing?
A I think that first point would be mooted. We would then proceed to whether or not the
determination was infirm. ...
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The second point which could possibly also be mooted if he gave a satisfactory written
determination, although I wouldn’t concede that it would be mooted, is that the Court
below [found], even though the Secretary made no documentation of his finding[,]
that this Court’s decision in United States against Morgan prohibited any inquiry of
the Secretary as to whether he did make the finding.186 And the difficulty which is
presented to anyone seeking review under the statute ... is that first the secretary is not
required to record the fact that he made the determination ... and [second] those
seeking review aren’t entitled to ask him whether he made it.187
Tennessee’s argument, in any event, could hardly have helped respondents; the state took the position
that all that was involved was the possibility of 90% federal subvention of the $2 million section
through the park proper, and that it could and would proceed on its own if that support was not
available. Where Mr. Reynolds’ argument addressed the merits, the importance of the case for grant
or not of the writ of certiorari, Tennessee could have been seen to have thumbed its nose at the Court.
The Court met in conference immediately following the day’s arguments; Justice Blackmun’s
notes of its discussion188 and the Court’s subsequent order granting a stay and providing for expedited
briefing and argument are both also dated December 7, 1970. This was an unusual step for a Court
usually conferring on Fridays, doubtless reflecting the waiting bulldozers. Justice Blackmun’s notes
reveal a Court closely divided whether the motion for stay and petition for certiorari (as it was agreed
the Justices would treat the motion) should be granted. The Justices do not seem to have doubted that
the Secretary had made a decision, and the Government’s opposition to the motion for stay had
informed them that he had instructed his staff to develop findings in all future such cases.189 Seeing
a statutory regime in transition, a commitment to future regularity, and the likelihood that future
proceedings would produce no change in outcome, the Chief Justice and Justices White, Stewart and
Blackmun were opposed taking up the case; impressed by the forcefulness of Congress’s instructions
and the sloppiness with which the case had apparently been handled in the Department, Justices
Black, Brennan and Harlan supported the motion. Justice Douglas had withdrawn from the case.
Justice Blackmun’s notes show that Justice Marshall (ultimately the opinion writer) first voted for,
then against, and finally for grant; he predicted that “if we remand, all we get is a sno job.” Justice
Marshall’s files say nothing that directly explains his ultimate decision in petitioners’ favor. Possibly,
however, he was influenced by the simultaneous pendency of a motion for stay in litigation involving
Breckinridge Park in San Antonio, the very dispute that had catalyzed enactment of the statutes in
question. That stay would also be granted December 7, although in this case with an invitation to
petition for certiorari on an accelerated basis, and he would (unsuccessfully) support its
continuance.190 Among Breckinridge Park, I-66 in Washington, D.C., and now Memphis, it would
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have been apparent that large issues were involved.
The Court’s December 7 order accommodated Tennesse’s impatience by placing the attorneys
under unusual time pressures. Customarily, petitioners have 90 and respondents then 60 days to brief
their cases in the Court once certiorari has been granted, with argument following within a few weeks.
The Court’s order provided two weeks briefing time to each side followed one week later by
argument. Petitioners’ brief, then, was due December 21. For the respondent state and federal
governments, the two weeks in question, were Monday, December 21, 1970 to Monday, January 4,
1971 ) the winter holiday season.
On the heels of the December 7 order, the Solicitor General complicated matters for attorney
Vardaman (and also ultimately for the government). He filed a motion suggesting remand to the
district court to permit the Secretary to introduce “the entire administrative record on which his
decisions were based.” In the world of hardball litigation tactics, you might be tempted to understand
such a motion might as a questionable device to bleed time from what was already a pressured
preparation. Yet the motion can be understood as responsive to by-play with Mr. Vardaman in oral
argument on the stay,191 as well as to the general concerns the Justices evidenced then about the state
of the record. Nor was it unambiguously advantageous to its maker; it both seemed to acknowledge
weakness in the case, and infuriated Memphians favoring construction of the road by conceding the
appropriateness of a further, indefinite stay during the requested remand. Petitioners as well as
Tennessee opposed the motion, on the ground that much remained for the Court to decide192 and that
the result could be unnecessary time and expense. At the same December 17 conference as the Court
decided to vacate its stay of construction in Breckinridge Park and to deny certiorari in that litigation,
the Court denied the motion.193 Little appears in the available papers to suggest why.
As the remand would eventually show, the suggestion instinct in the Solicitor General's motion,
that there was a record in the case, was itself mischievous. Note how the compression of time to
develop argument in the Court may have compromised the SG’s ability to inform himself on this
question. An informal and largely bureaucratic action such as this continuing course of route and
design negotiation and approval generates no record in the judicial sense ) indeed, at one point in its
opinion the Court recognizes that the agency process "is not designed to produce a record that is to
be the basis of agency action ) the basic requirement for substantial evidence review." Nonetheless,
the Court was persuaded that "there is an administrative record that allows the full, prompt review
of the Secretary's action that is sought without the additional delay which would result from having
a remand to the Secretary." Unsurprisingly, the remand proved that no such record existed. Time to
develop the appeal would have avoided the error ) indeed, by focusing the Court's attention on the
difficulties of reviewing the factual and judgmental bases of informal agency action, it might have
led to a rather different result.
The briefs were timely filed on all sides. Influenced by what had gone before, as well as by the
strategic sense that arose from the Three Sisters’ Bridge controversies, petitioner’s brief tended to
emphasize two arguments – first, that the new statutes imposed an obligation that could be satisfied
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only by written findings, and that at the least, in the absence of written findings, Morgan should be
understood to permit an inquiry into whether the Secretary had made the statutorily required decisions
(as distinct from how they were made, which petitioners conceded to be an improper inquiry); second,
that any review should use the substantial evidence test, under which one would find questions of fact
precluding summary judgment. Implicit in the first argument was a relatively absolutist take on the
requirements imposed by §138 and §4(f); petitioners also argued that the findings policy the Secretary
had subsequently adopted should be applied in this case; and that the SG’s motion to remand
implicitly conceded the need for submission of the administrative record, rather than Swicker’s
litigation affidavit. The Three Sisters’ Bridge litigation was extensively invoked to suggest a rotten
smell from the Department.194 Implicit in the second was a concession that “arbitrary and capricious”
review would not amount to much; petitioners did not significantly address its meaning. The SG’s
brief was responsive. Agreeing that the Secretary must address parkland values and protect them, it
argued that this had to occur in the context of a “delicate task of balancing,” inter alia, the possibly
harsh impact of alternatives on other values.195 This of course suggested that it would be useful to
know whether such balancing had in fact occurred, but the SG argued that here there was no
indication of the bad faith claimed in Morgan and shown in the Three Sisters’ Bridge litigation. The
statute imposed no findings requirement, the Secretary’s new policy was discretionary (i.e., not an
action recognizing legally binding requirements) and should not be applied to processes that had
reached administrative finality before its announcement; inquiry into the Secretary’s decision process
would be improper. He argued, as well, that under the APA the only available standard of review
was to determine whether the Secretary’s judgment had been “arbitrary and capricious.” Again, there
was no argument about the meaning of that standard; both sides seem to have assumed that (as any
lawyer would have advised before the decision in Overton Park) “arbitrary and capricious” review
would prove highly deferential. But, consistent with the motion to remand the SG had filed, the
government’s brief conceded that if the Court concluded either that the statutes required findings or
that petitioners had successfully raised genuine questions of fact about whether the Secretary’s
judgment had been “arbitrary and capricious,” then a remand to permit introduction of the entire
administrative record would be appropriate.196
What had actually happened? How could a court know this? Had the Secretary correctly
understood the new requirements imposed by the statutes under which he was acting? These had
emerged as central questions in the litigation, and the SG’s course of conduct tended to underscore
them. Now, minutes before oral argument was to begin, he took a step that drove this perspective
home. Attorney Vardaman wrote a friend a few weeks after the argument,
As I was sitting at counsel table at 9:55 a.m. ... my former Dean, now Solicitor General,
decked out in full regalia [came] over tome and handed me two pieces of paper. He said they
were affidavits of Secretary Volpe and former Secretary Boyd in which they swore that they
had made the decisions required by statute. Conjuring up my best expression of disbelief, I
inquired as to whether I correctly understood that he was attempting to file those as evidence
in the case about to be argued. He replied that he was filing them for whatever they were
worth.197
The two certificates were each two pages long. Secretary Boyd:
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... In view of the mandate of section 4(f) ... and protests received concerning the routing of
Interstate Highway 40 through Memphis, Tennessee, I decided to have this routing studied
to see that it conformed to that provision of law. Alternative routes were examined, and local
government officials and local groups, such as Citizens to Preserve OVerton Park, were
consulted on this matter. ... I determined and found as a fact that there was no feasible and
prudent alternative to routing this highway generally along the bus roadway through Overton
Park ... Because section 4(f) required that the project must include all possible planning to
minimize harm to the park, I insisted upon a rigorous investigation of measures which might
be taken to minimize adverse impact. ...
And Secretary Volpe:
... At the time I took office, my predecessor had made his determination that there was no
feasible and prudent alternative to the route location of I-40 in Memphis Tennessee. During
the [subsequent months] ... work proceeded on those sections of I-40 leading to the park. I
therefore made a determination that there was no feasible and prudent alternative to the
location ... it was my responsibility to decide whether the project included all possible
planning to minimize harm to the park ... After personally reviewing the results of studies of
suggested design alternatives in October and November, 1969, I determined and found as a
fact that the “depressed” highway design is the one which would include all possible planning
to minimize harm to the park if certain modifications were adopted. I therefore granted my
approval subject to the acceptance by the Tennessee Highway Department of certain
conditions ... subject to my continuing review.
As with the motion to remand, one might fear that submitting these certificates on the very day
of argument was a litigation tactic calculated to distract a young and relatively inexperienced
adversary. Yet one might also understand it more innocently, as directly responsive to the invitation
implicit in the Q & A with Vardaman at the argument over the stay.198 If one took that byplay
seriously, the government – after giving the Court an opportunity to send the case back – had now
supplied what the record lacked: personal attestations by the responsible Secretaries that they had
made the relevant decisions in awareness of the governing law. Given how one might reasonably
have understood the meaning of “arbitrary and capricious” at the time – and if Morgan had
successfully been invoked and the Three Sisters Bridge imbroglio distinguished – the government
might be home free.
Still, on the very cusp of argument? Perhaps the lateness of this filing was the product not of
scheming for litigation advantage, but of the holiday season, and resulting difficulty in finding
Secretaries Boyd and Volpe and creating the necessary papers.199 The Solicitor General is an
institutional litigator, appearing before the Court dozens of times each Term. This was no longer a
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fledgling attorney; the Solicitor General himself was acting. While the familiarity of the SG and the
Court might breed a certain insouciance about providing supplementary materials,200 it also creates
a certain sensitivity to signals like the one apparently given at the oral argument on the stay. And it
entails an institutional reputation quite transcending issues of victory and loss in any individual case,
an institutional reputation that any Solicitor General would be assiduous to protect. It seems unlikely
that any SG would act to secure an immediate litigating “advantage,” if indeed he could think that
apparent unfairness to an adversary would benefit his argument, at cost to that reputation. Nor did
any of the Justices abrade him about the filing.
Still, you might put yourself in the shoes of attorney Vardaman, surprised in this way just as he
was composing himself for his thirty minutes of oral argument about to begin. How would you
respond?
Shortly into my oral argument I called attention to the fact approximately five minutes before
argument had begun I had seen these “too-late formulations”201 for the first time and suggested
that if the Solicitor General wished to supplement his record with the testimony of additional
witnesses, the proper place todo that was in district court where the plaintiffs would have the
full right of cross-examination.202
Vardaman’s basic approach was to seek to persuade the Court that it was in no position to know what
had happened in the Department; that the Solicitor General’s intervention – both the motion to
remand and now these certificates – essentially conceded as much; and that given the chance, he could
prove that the averments of at least Secretary Boyd’s certificate, that he had made a decision in April
1968, were false. No prior document had connected the Secretary, rather than Administrator
Bridwell, to the April decision; and Administrator Bridwell had testified to Congress and would state
on the record if permitted to that he had made no independent findings himself, but had left matters
in the hands of the Memphis City Council. The certificates essentially made Vardaman’s point about
the one-sidedness of the materials before the Court:
I think that this is an extraordinary effort in which to, manner in which to present evidence
in a case; particularly since we were not permitted – in fact the Court of Appeals held that we
were barred by this Court’s decision in Morgan, from taking a deposition [of Administrator
Bridwell] which we specifically offer would dispute one of these affidavits.203
The bulk of his oral argument (and rebuttal) then explored just what propositions of fact he thought
he should be entitled to inquire into. Vardaman knew that he would not get past Morgan; he denied
again and again that he was interested in exploring the details of the Secretary’s (or Bridwell’s)
decision process if in fact the Secretary (or Bridwell) had made a decision; but that what he thought
he could show was that these individuals had not in fact decided matters, but had in effect unlawfully
delegated decision to the Memphis City Council.
[T]hose attacking decisions must be able to ascertain what decisions were made and what the
basis, that is what the documents before the person would have been in order that they can
seek a review ... of what he did on the basis of what he purportedly acted upon.204
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Whether the statute required formal findings, an important element of petitioner’s brief, hardly
figured in the oral argument; whether review should be under a “substantial evidence” or “arbitrary
and capricious” standard was mentioned only in the last fifteen or so seconds of the argument; what
the content of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard might be – that is, what you have probably read
the case to learn – was not discussed at all.
The Solicitor General’s argument was a good deal calmer than Mr. Vardaman’s. The first half
of it dealt essentially with the geography of the park and the highway through it – how little land
would be taken (and how considerately, given the existing bus road configuration), and that Memphis
had now used the funds it had received for the 26 acres to acquire more than twelve times as many
acres of new parklands to replace them. Then turning to the question whether findings were required,
he explained the submissions he had made205 and reasserted the government’s reading of the statute,
that – as the legislative history established – it entailed delicate secretarial balancing of competing
considerations. Review, he asserted, should be under the “arbitrary or capricious” standard – but he,
too, did not explore what that might be, nor did any Justice seem to be interested in that question.
But, in a way confirming Vardaman’s reading of the government’s behavior as a soft confession of
error, he argued
If the Court feels that the question of arbitrary and capricious cannot be determined on this
record, and we felt that there was some indication of that in the previous argument, then we
rely on our motion to remand for the purpose of allowing the admission of the administrative
record in the District Court.
We do not think there should be a remand for a full trial unless the District Court finds
after examining the administrative record that it cannot decide the issue of arbitrary and
capricious action without a further trial. We filed the motion of remand not for the purpose
of conceding error, as Mr. Vardaman says, but for the purpose of narrowing the scope of any
remand ... .206
Then echoing Justice Marshall’s remarks in the first conference,207 he suggested that a remand would
prove
a triumph of formalism. With the benefit of hindsight, this record is not all that I might like
to have. ... It would be better if we didn’t have to piece out the essence of their determinations
from other actions which they took like press releases and resolutions and letters and
affidavits ... [but] remand for further proceedings would, I think, be a kind of mechanical
jurisprudence more fitting for a Baron Park than for the final third of the 20th century.208
These words evoked some rather querulous questioning by at least one Justice. Do you think the SG’s
peroration, following, any more likely to have been successful, however well it may have invoked
what proved to be the stakes?
The fundamental question here [is] one of the separation of powers, of the proper
allocation of function to courts, legislatures and the executive branch, in the important and
complex task of carrying on government. Two things are clear: one is that Congress has
legislated certain specific requirements with respect to the use of parklands and the other is
that it has allocated the administration of that provision to the executive branch, specifically
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to the Secretary of Transportation.
This does not mean that there is no role for the courts, for the Secretary should be held in
check if he ignores the legislative requirements. But it does mean that the proper role of the
courts is a narrow and limited one and it is important, I submit, both for the administration
of the government and for the court that the limited nature of that role be recognized and
observed. It is not good government to have all governmental decisions decided by courts, or
even to have a situation where, as a matter of routine, all questions arising in the
administration of the government are habitually referred to courts.209
In recent years more and more governmental decisions are being made by courts. The
recent broadening or near elimination of concepts of standing and the limitations on sovereign
immunity as a defense have contributed to this result.
Of course, courts should see that the Constitution is complied with when the statutory
rules are followed, but is it wise that the substance of all administrative action should be
subject to reevaluation in the courts?
What the two Secretaries have done here, they have acted; what they have done is rational;
and it complies with the directive given to them by Congress; the decision was for them. It
should be upheld and the judgment below should be affirmed.
Mr. Vardaman’s final words would invoke “the battle to preserve this nation’s environment against
projects such as that involved here.”210
Justice Blackmun wrote a memo to himself, reflecting again a view that “this is a great tempest
without much outrageous substance.” Morgan should preclude inquiry into the Secretaries’ thinking,
but the record is “fuzzy,” and “what we may get down to is whether the case should be remanded for
adherence to some of the formalities. The ultimate result is perfectly clear ... As Justice Marshall
pointed out in conference, if we remand we will get only a snow job and nothing more. The
practicalities of the situation argue against the remand. On the other side is the fact that this is good
discipline for the agency and it may well satisfy the objectors.” His notes of the ensuing conference
suggest that the dividing line between majority and dissent reflected feelings about the importance
of the case. The remand to the district court was to a significant degree the product of what was
understood as the SG’s acceptance if not urging of that outcome, and was not expected to produce
change; Justices Black and Brennan, initially joined by Justice Harlan, felt much more strongly that
substance was at stake.
The Chief Justice assigned Justice Marshall the opinion, asking him to give it priority; 211 it would
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be issued a mere six weeks after argument. He would, as you know, write extensively and
influentially about the meaning of “arbitrary and capricious” review – a question that although
essentially unbriefed would be the enduring contribution of the case. The records at the Library of
Congress suggest little appreciation that this would be the case’s future import, or difficulty among
the Justices with what he had written.
Epilogue
Victory came both as vindication and as challenge. The young lawyers who had been pursuing
and coordinating the growing body of highway litigation – not just Vardaman, Norton, and Newton,
but Anthony Kline in California, Al Butzel in New York – were having a remarkable impact.
“We were the masters of this subject; to be only thirty and know you know more about an
important set of issues than anyone else, that is a remarkable place to be at the beginning of
a professional career.”212
Yet, promising further proceedings, victory also underscored significant personal and professional
issues. Although settings in which a young lawyer could take responsibilities unusual for his newness
to the profession and grow considerably in skill and reputation, these lawsuits were not valuable
business opportunities for the lawyer or, particularly, his firm. Vardaman was fortunate as a young
lawyer developing a career to have an employer who understood the long-term benefits for his firm
of the experience he was getting; Edward Bennett Williams, who had started his own career in not
dissimilar ways, continued to pay his salary and provide a year-end bonus, But it hardly had to be that
way. Vardaman’s correspondence files show continuing struggles to have even out-of-pocket
expenses paid; one letter written shortly after victory in the Supreme Court remarked that he and
Charles Newman had been paid a fee of $4000 – $4/hour – for an estimated 1000 “billable hours”
through the Supreme Court decision.213 Now he would have to prepare for an extended trial, with
depositions, transcripts and other expenses as well as his own commitments of time. Shortly after
the Supreme Court’s decision, Vardaman’s correspondence estimated the post-decision trial expenses
at $17,000; he asked as well for some compensation – but he was clear from the outset that he would
not insist on the latter, and that he had set that request “considerably below our normal hourly
rates.”214 Much of his correspondence files in the wake of victory are taken up with efforts to get
reimbursement, including CPOP’s reports of appeals both to foundations and national organizations
that might prove willing to help and to their neighbors. A momentous victory had to be nailed down,
and that would not come cheap. CPOP was struggling with a treasury balance under $1500;215 a few
weeks later, one of its members reported to Vardaman that she had “contributed a bronze vase which
brought us $75 ... placed contribution can and collected funds at neighboring store.”216 It is unlikely
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these sums compensated the firms even for secretarial time; and then there was always the chance that
other firm clients would fail to appreciate what the law suits were accomplishing.
The events following Vardaman’s estimates – 25 days of trial before Judge Brown and a 6500page record seeking to reconstruct what the administration knew or should have known on the
questions of prudence and feasibility, numerous administrative proceedings and appeals – would
make them risibly low.217 On January 5, 1972, Judge Brown ordered the case remanded to the
Secretary to decide the matter in accordance with the statute as the Supreme Court had interpreted
it. The Department's prior action had not been based on a correct understanding of the statute, he
found; but Judge Brown’s opinion also strongly signalled a substantial willingness to uphold whatever
decision the Secretary might reach.218 Now, however, Secretary Volpe found himself obliged to apply
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969;219 in January of 1973, after further hearings in
Memphis, he found ) without specifying what it would be ) that there was at least one "feasible and
prudent alternative" to the route through the park.220 Judge Brown would have required him to specify
that alternative, but in April 1974, the Sixth Circuit upheld the Secretary’s judgment; the statute
required him only to find that at least one such alternative existed, and he need not specify what it
was.221
This stage of the litigation held out some possibility of financial relief – if attorney Vardaman was
able to persuade the courts that his services fell within the “private attorney general” rationale that
had recently acquired substantial currency in the courts, and that the Eleventh Amendment did not
preclude applying that line of cases to a state, he might be able to recover compensation for his
services that CPOP had proved unable to provide. The Sixth Circuit had found the Eleventh
Amendment precluded recovery, and on this issue alone Vardaman once again filed a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court.222 The Court had already granted certiorari in Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, and with its decision in that case repudiating the private
attorney general rationale,223 any such possibility disappeared. Whatever the rewards of this
representation, they were not going to be financial.
Vardaman continued to hear about Overton Park from time to time, as DOT officials would seek
to include him in their discussions of the issue. Under continuing pressure from the state, the
Department kept studying how I-40 might be completed; while alternative routes were apparently
considered, serious discussion focussed only on alternative designs for a road going through the park,
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Vardaman w ould tell the Supreme Court in his pe tition for certiorari, n. ? below, that “counsel for the petitioners
had spent approxim ately 27 00 hours o n this litigation betwe en the filing o f the com plaint an d the notice o f appeal.”
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federal judgments.
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in apparent recognition of the disruption otherwise likely to be caused. In September 1974, Tennessee
submitted a new proposal opting for an open cut design through the park. Secretary Brinegar
instructed the FHWA in January of the following year that an open cut design could not be approved
under §4(f) and asked for an evaluation of tunneling alternatives. In April 1975, President Ford's then
Secretary of Transportation, William Coleman, announced his provisional judgment that the road
should be built as a two-tier tunnel under the Park;224 even apart from the initial outlay, the expense
of maintaining such a tunnel ) not then payable from the federal Highway Trust Fund ) made that
alternative unacceptable to the state. A study of a single level tunnel was completed in March 1976,
and Tennessee held further hearings in Memphis in August. The Deputy Secretary of Transportation
scheduled a hearing in Memphis for November 1976, but canceled it once Jimmy Carter had been
elected, in response to a request from Tennessee officials who evidently expected to find the new
administration more cooperative.225 The state then proposed a design that would be partially tunneled,
partly depressed, and in October 1977 the Department rejected it;226 within weeks a new design for
more, but still not complete, tunneling had been presented and, again, rejected.227 The State threw
in the towel in the waning moments of the Carter administration and asked that the segment through
Memphis be dropped from the interstate system;228 about $300 million in federal funds committed
to building the road then began to be released to Memphis for other transportation purposes,229 and
in 1987 Tennessee returned the parkland to the city. The possibility of an east-west expressway, now
outside I-40, lives yet in the minds of some Memphians.
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“Windfall Needs Vision,” The Commercial Appeal, Monday, Jan. 19, 1981, p. 4 remarked

Op pon ents of the ro ute were so metimes criticized as busybodies and obstructionists. Events have proved,
however, that they were the ones with vision. Protection of the park beca me, in the ir lengthy battle through the
courts, a symbol not only of environmental quality but also of larger concerns about what kind of a city
Memp his shou ld try to become ...
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